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THE GRAVITATIONAL FORCE OF FEDERAL LAW

SCOTT DODSON†
In the American system of dual sovereignty, states have primary authority over
matters of state law. In nonpreemptive areas in which state and federal regimes are
parallel—such as matters of court procedure, certain statutory law, and even some
constitutional law—states have full authority to legislate and interpret state law in
ways that diverge from analogous federal law. But, in large measure, they do not. It
is as if federal law exerts a gravitational force that draws states to mimic federal law
even when federal law does not require state conformity. This Article explores the
widespread phenomenon of federal law’s gravitational pull. The Article begins by
identifying the existence of a gravitational force throughout a range of procedural and
substantive law felt by a host of state actors, including state rulemakers, legislators,
judges, and even the people themselves. It then excavates some explanatory vectors to
help understand and appreciate why federal law exerts a gravitational force. Finally,
the Article considers some normative concerns with state acquiescence to the federal
gravitational pull.
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INTRODUCTION
Federalism promotes state autonomy in the development of legal norms,
both as a matter of sovereignty and as a matter of experimentation. For the
most part, states as sovereigns are entitled to design, implement, and interpret
their respective state laws as they see fit. Their independence inures to the
benefit of the whole, for state laws can be constructed to fit their particular
local cultures, and the resulting diversity can offer opportunities for innovation
and experimentation without damaging the whole.
Perhaps no one in the early modern era more forcefully pressed this vision
of state autonomy than Justice Louis Brandeis. In a 1932 dissent challenging
the Lochner-era Court’s propensity to invalidate state laws on federal constitutional
grounds, Brandeis famously wrote, “It is one of the happy incidents of the
federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve
as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk
to the rest of the country.”1 The premise was that states wanted to innovate.
States wanted to exercise their sovereign independence, but the Supreme
Court would not let them.
Six years later, Brandeis penned the even more famous opinion in Erie
Railroad v. Tompkins, which prohibited federal courts from developing common
law in diversity cases.2 Erie overruled a previous case, Swift v. Tyson, which
had allowed federal courts to develop their own substantive federal common
1
2

New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79-80 (1938).
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law. Swift was premised in part on the idea that state courts would follow
federal law on common-law matters, and that states would follow federal
common-law development not as a matter of command but as a matter of
judgment.3 In Erie, Brandeis decreed that history had repudiated that premise:
state courts refused to be followers.4 And he confirmed the sovereign prerogative
of independent state lawmaking in a federalist system.5
In light of Brandeis’s powerful vision—oft-repeated by scholars and
courts—one might expect the states to take full advantage of their lawmaking
independence to forge legal norms and regimes that reflect the whims and
prejudices of their own citizenries, even when those norms and regimes differ
profoundly from those of the nation as a whole.6 But in fact, since Erie, states
have routinely followed federal law even when adherence is not compelled.
Rather than blaze their own paths, states tend to look to federal law as their
starting points. It is as if federal law exerts a kind of gravitational pull on
states. This gravitational pull expands beyond courts—to legislatures, rulemakers,
and even the people themselves.
The Constitution’s Supremacy Clause, of course, makes some state
following of federal law mandatory.7 But I mean to focus on following of a
different nature, one that derives not from legal compulsion but rather from
allurement. This kind of state following persists in a host of areas traversing
both procedural and substantive law. In each area, states often follow federal
law for woefully inadequate reasons, and sometimes for no reason at all.
To be sure, federal lawmaking and interpretation may reflect a common
policy shared by states, such that states mirror federal pronouncements because
both sovereigns share similar policy goals. But there is evidence that much
state parallelism is not independent. As this Article documents, states follow
even abrupt and counterintuitive changes in federal law. If the Pied Piper
heads out of town in the direction of a candy store, it may be difficult to tell
3 See Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18-19 (1842) (holding that federal courts do not need
to follow state court common law in issues of general commercial law because court decisions are
“only evidence of what the laws are; and are not of themselves law”).
4 See Erie, 304 U.S. at 74 (“Persistence of state courts in their own opinions on questions of
common law prevented uniformity . . . .”).
5 See id. at 78-79 (explaining that “Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of
common law applicable in a State” and that interference in the judicial and legislative affairs of the
state is an infringement of a state’s independence).
6 Even today, commentators advocate for limited national power on the assumption that states
will fill the space with innovation, and that expansive national power stifles innovation. See, e.g.,
Myron T. Steele & Peter I. Tsoflias, Realigning the Constitutional Pendulum, 77 ALB. L. REV. 1365,
1369-70 (2013/2014) (emphasizing that the importance of federalism lies in the ability of states to
implement policy on a gradual and piecemeal level, which allows for feedback and improved
institutional learning).
7 See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (establishing the supremacy of the Constitution and the “Laws
of the United States”).
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whether the children are being lured by the music or the sweets. But if the
Piper abruptly turns ninety degrees and the children still follow, then the
parents would be convinced that it was the music. Examples of such state
following abound.
This Article’s central thesis is that something more than independent
parallel conduct is afoot: federal law exerts a widespread gravitational pull on
state actors.8 To be sure, the pull of federal law is not inexorable. State actors can
and do resist and diverge from federal law. But these counterexamples are
also a part of the story. Perhaps paradoxically, they help prove that the
gravitational force exists, and they offer clues as to why it has such pull.
In Part I, I defend the descriptive claim that federal law’s gravitational force
affects a wide array of state actors (including state rulemakers, legislators, and
courts) across various areas of nonpreemptive law (procedural rules, substantive
statutes, and constitutional provisions). In these areas, state actors have
authority to craft regimes and render interpretations different from—even
contrary to—federal law, and one might expect states to exercise this authority
with some frequency. But, in significant measure, they instead follow federal law.
Even when they resist the impulse to follow, they muster tremendous effort to
do so. Federal law is a Piper’s song that captivates the states.
Part II theorizes explanations for the gravitational force of federal law and
for states’ tendencies to follow. Mimicking federal law may offer a relatively
safe way to ease the cognitive, systemic, and resource pressures of independently
developing and maintaining a workable legal system. Or perhaps intrastate
vertical uniformity is of overriding importance. State actors might be more
familiar with federal law than state law. Or elected state actors could believe
federal law offers political cover for their enactments or decisions. And following
begets more following, resulting in a habit that supplies its own compulsion.
Part III then considers the normativity of the gravitational force of federal
law and stakes out some of its vices. Following comes at the expense of the
salutary benefits of variation and experimentation. Following can distort state
law in ways that cause state law to misalign with, and potentially undermine,
the policies and preferences of the state electorate. By appearing to be a
shortcut, following can mar the reputation of states as coequal sovereigns in a
federalist system. And, perhaps most troubling, following can induce cyclical
entrenchment of the very causes of following in the first place.

8 Others have used this or a related term in off-hand and narrower ways. See, e.g., Glenn S.
Koppel, Toward a New Federalism in State Civil Justice: Developing a Uniform Code of State Civil
Procedure Through a Collaborative Rule-Making Process, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1167, 1186 (2005) (noting
“the decreasing gravitational pull of the Federal Rules on the states”). However, I am the first to
explore the concept systematically across various doctrines and legal actors.
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I conclude with calls to action. I entreat states to seize their own
empowerment and tackle state law with the attention to state interests that it
deserves. At the same time, I urge federal actors to conduct their business
with sensitivity to its shadow effect on states. I also seek others to join in a
sociological and empirical effort to study and understand better the
gravitational force of federal law.
I. FEDERAL GRAVITY
In this Part, I stake out the descriptive claim that federal law exerts a
gravitational pull on state actors. To defend the claim, I consider a number of
examples of procedural and substantive law, and I study relationships among
courts, rulemakers, and legislators.
A. Procedure
In the post-1938 world, federal and state courts independently develop
and apply their own procedures. Except in very limited contexts, forum
procedure controls: federal procedure applies in federal courts, and state
procedure applies in state courts.9 Thus, states are free to adopt their own
rules of procedure, and state courts are free to interpret their state rules
independently of federal rules and federal judicial opinions.10 Consequently,
consideration of procedural rules presents an opportunity to study the
gravitational effect of federal law on both state rulemakers and state courts.
1. State Rulemakers
Before 1938, states had a long history of innovation and self-reliance in
designing civil procedure. States had been doing so independently since the
Revolutionary Era, and although they engaged in borrowing from English
traditions and from sister states, they generally exhibited the willingness and
freedom to develop the particular procedure that best fit their needs, even if
that independence caused significant disuniformity among states. Conversely,
federal procedure was largely derivative. The Process and Conformity Acts
required federal courts to apply the applicable state court rules of procedure

9 See Kevin M. Clermont, Reverse-Erie, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 48 (2006) (noting that in
our federal system an initial question is whether federal or state law applies—a question with a
relatively clear answer in most cases).
10 See Scott Dodson, A Closer Look at New Pleading in the Litigation Marketplace, JUDICATURE,
Aug. 2015, at 11, 17 (noting that state courts are within their rights to reject the new federal pleading
standards set forth in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), because federal court
interpretations of federal laws do not legally affect state procedural rules).
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in the state in which they sat, effectively directing federal courts to follow
state rules.11
In 1822, the Supreme Court adopted the Federal Equity Rules, derived
from English equity tradition, to provide uniform equity procedure in federal
courts.12 Yet the states continued to exercise procedural independence in
equity. Many states avoided the Federal Equity Rules and instead adopted
New York’s Field Code, which merged law and equity.13 In both law and
equity, states readily asserted their independence, divergence, and even
leadership in matters of procedure.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, adopted in 1938, ushered in a new
era of federal procedural uniformity. Federal interstate uniformity made some
sense, but the revolutionary procedural changes made by the Federal Rules
seemed a poor model for states. The Rules were modeled on principles of
equity, a dramatic historical change that most states had already rejected in
favor of procedural regimes built on principles of the common law.14 Meanwhile,
the state benches and bars of the 1930s were highly provincial. Senator
Thomas Walsh of Montana argued that the new Federal Rules, which he
believed were designed for complex cases likely to be pursued in urban
centers, would create tension with the code practice that worked well in many
states.15 He repeatedly admonished that the national legal community was
11 See Conformity Act of 1872, ch. 255, § 5, 17 Stat. 196, 197 (declaring that “practice, pleadings,
and forms and modes of proceeding” in federal district and circuit courts should conform “as near as
may be” with the procedures of state court); Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 36, § 2, 1 Stat. 275, 276 (providing
that “the forms of writs, executions, and other process” shall be the same in federal courts as those
used in state court); Federal Judicial Act of 1789, ch. 21, § 2, 1 Stat. 93, 93-94 (declaring the forms
of writs and executions in federal court be the same as the processes of the supreme court of the
state where the federal court sits). For a history of the numerous statutes directing federal courts to
apply state procedure, see Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV.
1015, 1036-42 (1982) (describing the problems with and dissatisfaction over attempts to standardize
federal and state procedural law through statutes like the Conformity Act of 1872).
12 See JAMES LOVE HOPKINS, THE NEW FEDERAL EQUITY RULES, at x-xii (Byron F. Babbitt
ed., 8th ed. 1933) (providing an updated version of Federal Equity Rules that first went into effect
in 1822). The Federal Equity Rules looked to English tradition rather than the states because state
equity procedure was sparse and varied. See Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common
Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 931 (1987)
(explaining the underdevelopment of equity in the states, which led to the application of historic
equity law and effectively disengaged law and equity as companion systems in the federal courts).
13 See Subrin, supra note 12, at 932-33, 939 (stating that half of the states adopted the New York
Field Code instead of the Federal Equity Rules).
14 See id. at 922, 926 (“The underlying philosophy of, and procedural choices embodied in the
Federal Rules were almost universally drawn from equity rather than common law . . . . Until the
twentieth century, however, the predominant mode of procedural thought, reinvigorated by Field
and his Code, was still common law based.”).
15 See id. at 996 (“Walsh’s opposition was normally characterized by his unwillingness to force
lawyers, particularly the ‘small practitioner and the country lawyer,’ to learn federal procedure that
is different from the procedural rules of their homes states, accompanied by his fear that the simple
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an amalgam of different local legal practices and cultures that should not be
forcibly unified.16
Given the longstanding history of common law procedure in the states,
the states’ tradition in procedural independence, and the recognition that
differing legal cultures demanded different procedural regimes, one might have
expected states to greet the Federal Rules with indifference, or, at most, with
curiosity tempered by independence. Yet, within a generation, most state
legislatures and rulemakers substantially adopted the Federal Rules as a model
for their own reforms. In 1960, Charles Wright surveyed state procedures and
found a trend toward adoption of the federal rules.17 John Oakley and Arthur
Coon, conducting an important follow-up study in 1986, found that twentythree state procedural regimes mirrored the federal rules to such a high degree
as to be categorized as “replica” states.18 Ten more were so similar to the Federal
code procedure of Western states would be somehow prejudiced by the complex procedure used in
metropolitan areas, such as New York.”).
16 See Burbank, supra note 11, at 1063-65, 1092 (discussing Walsh’s concern that a uniform federal
procedure would cause inconvenience and interpretive problems); Subrin, supra note 12, at 956 n.276,
998 (describing Walsh’s argument that a large country whose regions had different customs and
needs should not have uniform rules). Some drafters of the Federal Rules publicly predicted that
states would adopt “mini-FRCPs” so as to create both interstate and intrastate uniformity. It is
unclear, however, whether these were sincere beliefs or whether these were overly optimistic political
rejoinders to those who, like Thomas Walsh, opposed the Federal Rules on grounds of intrastate
disuniformity. See Koppel, supra note 8, at 1179 (describing the drafters’ goal to provide uniform
federal and state procedure); Stephen N. Subrin, A New Era in American Civil Procedure, 67 A.B.A. J.
1648, 1650 (1981) (presenting Walsh’s argument that “the price of this interfederal court uniformity
was the loss of intrastate uniformity”); see also Thomas Wall Shelton, A New Era of Judicial Relations,
23 CASE & COMMENT 388, 393 (1916) (“[A] simple, scientific, correlated system of rules, such as
would be prepared and promulgated by the Supreme Court of the United States, would prove a
model that would, for reasons of convenience as well as of principle, be adopted by the states.”).
Interestingly, many prominent reformers’ states—including New York (William Mitchell and the
ABA), Connecticut (Charles Clark), and Nebraska (Roscoe Pound)—adhered predominantly to the
old code-based procedural system. See John B. Oakley & Arthur F. Coon, The Federal Rules in State
Courts: A Survey of State Court Systems of Civil Procedure, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1367, 1378 (1986)
(classifying six states as those “which have neither notice pleading nor a rules-based procedural
system in common with the Federal Rules”).
17 1 WILLIAM W. BARRON & ALEXANDER HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE §§ 9.1–.53, at 46-80 (Charles Alan Wright ed., 1960).
18 Oakley & Coon, supra note 16, at 1377 (Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, District of
Columbia, Hawaii, Indiana, Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana, New Mexico,
North Dakota, Ohio, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Washington, West
Virginia, Wyoming). Idaho, Mississippi, and Nevada, which also had notice pleading, and Arkansas,
Delaware, and South Carolina, which had fact pleading, were considered to have modeled their
regimes on the Federal Rules. Id. at 1377-78. Iowa, Michigan, and Wisconsin had adopted the notice
pleading of the Federal Rules but otherwise had “[i]diosyncratic [r]ules-[b]ased [p]rocedural
system[s]”; New Hampshire had notice pleading but otherwise an “[i]diosyncratic [p]rocedural
[s]ystem”; Georgia, Kansas, North Carolina, and Oklahoma had notice pleading but a “[f]ederal
[c]ode [p]rocedural [s]ystem”; Florida, Maryland, Missouri, New Jersey, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
Texas, and Virginia had fact pleading and idiosyncratic rules-based procedural systems; and
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Rules as to be considered “substantially conforming” systems.19 Indeed, Oakley
and Coon concluded that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure exerted a
“pervasive nationwide influence . . . in that [by 1977] all states had adopted
federal procedure to some degree.”20 Oakley and Coon were not alone in this
observation; Charles Alan Wright and Mary Kay Kane noted, “[T]here is not
a jurisdiction that has not revised its procedure in some way that reflects the
influence of the federal rules.”21
Oakley and Coon were surprised by their findings, but not in the way one
might expect. They were shocked that only twenty-three states were substantial
conformists.22 Thus, Oakley and Coon meant to tell a story of state resistance,
a story that Oakley continued in a follow-up study in 2002.23
Of course, states can—and sometimes do—blaze their own trails,24 and
Oakley and Coon reveal intriguing instances of state divergence.25 I explore
this divergence in more detail in Part II. But Oakley and Coon’s study also
tells an important and overlooked story about the gravitational pull of the
Federal Rules on state lawmakers. Despite historical, procedural, and cultural
reasons for states to react to the Federal Rules with diffidence, the adoption of
the Federal Rules wrenched the states off their traditional courses. Most states’
rules now mirror the Federal Rules, and the rest have been pulled toward the
Federal Rules in significant ways. In every state, federal rulemakers have exerted
an extraordinary gravitational pull on state rulemakers.
California, Connecticut, Illinois, Louisiana, Nebraska, and New York had fact pleading and codebased procedural systems. Id.
19 See John B. Oakley, A Fresh Look at the Federal Rules in State Courts, 3 NEV. L.J. 354, 358 (2002).
20 Oakley & Coon, supra note 16, at 1371 (emphasis added); see also Thomas O. Main, Procedural
Uniformity and the Exaggerated Role of Rules: A Survey of Intra-State Uniformity in Three States that Have
Not Adopted the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 46 VILL. L. REV. 311, 326-29 (2001) (finding summary
judgment rules and discovery practices to be remarkably similar to the federal rules in Illinois,
Pennsylvania, and Nebraska—states found by Oakley and Coon to have procedural systems least
influenced by the federal model).
21 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 431 (7th ed. 2011).
22 Oakley & Coon, supra note 16, at 1369.
23 See Oakley, supra note 19, at 355 (finding “a general disinclination of states to conform to the
ever-changing contours of the FRCP”).
24 For example, Arizona, until recently a die-hard “replica” state, adopted unique discovery
rules. See Koppel, supra note 8, at 1173 (noting that Arizona “took off on its own discovery reform
trip, adopting a package of discovery reforms more aggressive than anything the federal rules have
implemented”). And, sometimes, these state innovations are followed by federal rulemakers and
courts. See id. at 1212 (explaining that following Arizona’s dramatic discovery reforms, the federal
courts created similar discovery rules); see also Stephen N. Subrin, Federal Rules, Local Rules, and
State Rules: Uniformity, Divergence, and Emerging Procedural Patterns, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1999, 2040-42
(1989) (identifying limitations on discovery practice as one example of state innovations that sparked
federal rule revision). But federal following is rarer than state following.
25 See Oakley & Coon, supra note 16, at 1426 (finding that the states with the highest levels of
divergence tended to be the largest and most populous states); see also Oakley, supra note 19, at 383
(demonstrating that state rulemakers today are less likely to follow federal rule amendments).
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2. State Courts
State rulemakers following federal rules is not the only procedural story.
The federal gravitational pull also affects courts. I explore those effects in two
contexts: state rules patterned after federal rules, and state rules that deviate
from federal rules.
a. State Rules Patterned After Federal Rules
State courts often follow federal courts when the applicable state rule mirrors
the federal rule. To some degree, this kind of following should be expected.
After all, the gravitational pull of the federal rule had its primary effect on the
state rulemakers at the rulemaking stage. That pull brought the state rule so
close to the federal rule that interpretations of each are likely to be similar.
But even here, the gravitational pull has an additional effect on state courts.
Although rules may be textually similar, a federal court interpretation of the
federal rule is not preemptive of the state rule or binding on state courts
interpreting the analogous state rule. And while state rulemakers may have
intended that state rules be interpreted in light of then-existing federal
precedent, it is far more tenuous to infer that the state rulemakers intended for
post-adoption federal precedent to be indicative of the state rule’s meaning.
Indeed, there are good reasons why state courts should not follow federal
courts on certain issues. Federal dockets have different cases and different
caseloads. Federal judges have life tenure and are less sensitive to local pressures.
State judges are under greater docket congestion and resource pressures than
federal judges.26 Different sets of attorneys appear in the different courts. These
differences may suggest that a state rule should be interpreted in light of particular
state contexts and norms, even if that results in an interpretation that diverges
from the interpretation given in an identically worded federal rule.
Yet the typical state court in this scenario tends to treat a federal appellate
opinion as presumptively controlling, or at least as highly persuasive
authority, without regard to any state policy reason for adherence or divergence.
As Oakley and Coon found, a substantial number of state courts reiterate that
they give, ipso facto, great weight to federal court interpretations of analogous
federal rules.27 For example, the Rhode Island Supreme Court recently stated:
“[W]here the Federal rule and our state rule are substantially similar, we will
26 See Stephen B. Burbank, Pleading and the Dilemmas of “General Rules,” 2009 WIS. L. REV. 535, 563
n.123 (explaining that the borrowing of the Federal Rules by state courts “is especially problematic to the
extent that state court judges are under greater docket and resource pressures than their federal colleagues,
depriving them of the ability to use the tools in the Federal Rules for managing litigation”).
27 Oakley & Coon, supra note 16, at 1381-424 (Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, D.C.,
Hawaii, Indiana, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Jersey, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Utah, West Virginia, and Wyoming).
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look to the Federal courts for guidance or interpretation of our own rule.”28
Revealingly, state courts rarely look to sister states’ interpretations of analogous
state rules; rather, their eyes are raised upward, looking to the federal system.
Pleading standards present a useful illustration. Rule 8 of the Federal
Rules, which states that a claimant need set out only “a short and plain statement
of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,”29 was designed to
liberalize pleading away from the old code-pleading standard requiring that
the allegation of facts state a cause of action.30 The new pleading standard
was so revolutionary that lower federal courts resisted the new standard, often
reverting back to code pleading in practice.31
In 1957, the Supreme Court put the debate to rest (at least for a time) in
Conley v. Gibson, holding that Rule 8 was a strongly liberalizing force and
directing lower courts to abide by it.32 Conley interpreted Rule 8 to require only
“a short and plain statement of the claim that will give the defendant fair notice
of what the plaintiff ’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.”33 Conley
also glossed Rule 12(b)(6)—the rule allowing dismissal for “failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted”34—with the following interpretation:
In appraising the sufficiency of the complaint we follow, of course, the
accepted rule that a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state
a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set
of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.35
States also have pleading rules, but Conley interpreted only Federal Rule 8.
Further, it is not obvious that Rules 8 and 12 mean what Conley said they did.36
28 Hall v. Kuzenka, 843 A.2d 474, 476 (R.I. 2004); see also, Am. Suzuki Motor Corp. v. Burns,
81 So.3d 320, 325 n.5 (Ala. 2011) (“As we have often stated, we look to the federal courts’ interpretation
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure when those rules are similar to our own.”).
29 FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
30 See SCOTT DODSON, NEW PLEADING IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: SLAMMING
THE FEDERAL COURTHOUSE DOORS? 19-23 (2013) (explaining that Rule 8 was intended to change
the requirements of a complaint so that it had to recount only “the general nature of the cases and
the circumstances or events upon which it is based . . . but not of details which he should ascertain
for himself in preparing his defense”).
31 See id. at 23-26 (discussing opposition to the changes to Rule 8 and how “opposition to the
liberality of discovery and pleadings surged”).
32 355 U.S. 41, 44-48 (1957). Many courts adhered to the liberal Conley standard in name only.
See, e.g., Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 86
COLUM. L. REV. 433, 448-50, 492 (1986) (providing specific examples of post-Conley courts
dismissing complaints for lack of specificity and asserting that “the new fact pleading is more
restrictive” than intended).
33 Id. at 47 (internal quotation marks omitted).
34 FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
35 Conley, 355 U.S. at 45-46.
36 See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., From Whom No Secrets Are Hid, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1665, 1685
(1998) (“Conley v. Gibson turned Rule 8 on its head . . . .”).
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States with their own pleading rules patterned after Federal Rules 8 and 12,
even with identical language, could reasonably have construed their rules
differently, especially given the different docket loads and pressures facing
state courts. Yet the states with replica rules universally adopted the Conley
construction for their own pleading rules.37 They heard the Piper’s call, lined
up, and followed for fifty years.
In 2007, the Supreme Court abruptly changed course. In the pair of
decisions Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly38 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal,39 the Court
embraced a different normative model for pleading (one of restriction rather
than access),40 imposed two new pleading requirements (plausibility and
nonconclusoriness),41 and abrogated Conley’s famous “no set of facts” standard.42
Importantly, the Court based its decisions in part on policy matters largely
confined to federal courts: the perceived increase in the cost of discovery under
the federal discovery rules, and the perceived inability of federal judges to
control that cost.43 Federal courts quickly got the memo after Iqbal and began
applying the new pleading standard relentlessly, as required.44 But the Supreme
Court’s new interpretation does not control state courts, which are free to
interpret their rules independent of federal interpretation. What, then, would
state courts do with this dramatic turn in federal pleading law?
One might think that a state court, empowered as a truly independent
system interpreting its own sovereign’s laws, would react to Twombly and Iqbal
with some indifference. Notions of stare decisis, state rulemaking history, state
policies, state practice, other state rules, and state institutional concerns should
37 See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 578 & n.5 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(describing how twenty-six states and the District of Columbia “[t]ak[e] their cues from the federal
court[]” and utilize the Conley formulation as their standard for dismissal of a complaint).
38 Id. (majority opinion).
39 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
40 See A. Benjamin Spencer, The Restrictive Ethos in Civil Procedure, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 353,
368 (2010) (“The Supreme Court’s capitulation to defendant requests for more stringent pleading
standards [in Twombly and Iqbal] is the clearest evidence of procedure’s tilt towards restrictiveness.”).
41 See DODSON, supra note 30, at 76 (explaining what the author calls “Iqbal Step One [where]
a court should disregard all conclusory allegations” and “Iqbal Step Two [where] the court assesses
the remaining well-pleaded factual allegations and their inferences to determine whether, in the
judge’s experience and common sense, the facts plausibly state entitlement to relief ”).
42 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 562-63 (holding that the “‘no set of facts’ language has been questioned,
criticized, and explained away long enough . . . . [It] is best forgotten as an incomplete, negative
gloss on an accepted pleading standard”).
43 See id. at 559 (“[T]he threat of discovery expense will push cost-conscious defendants to
settle even anemic cases . . . . Probably, then, it is only by taking care to require allegations that
reach the level suggesting conspiracy that we can hope to avoid the potentially enormous expense of
discovery in cases with no ‘reasonably founded hope that the [discovery] process will reveal relevant
evidence’ to support a § 1 claim.”); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79 (warning that Rule 8 “does not
unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions” (internal
citations omitted)).
44 See DODSON, supra note 30, at 80.
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be far more relevant. Absent some state-specific reason for changing course,
Twombly and Iqbal, nonpreemptive decisions based on federal policies, federal
practices, and federal rules, ought not be particularly worthy of state attention.45
Yet several state supreme courts have followed Twombly or Iqbal for no
apparent reason. In Iannacchino v. Ford Motor Co., the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court simply quoted the Supreme Court’s decisions and summarily
adopted the new federal standard:
While we have concluded that the plaintiffs’ complaint is insufficient
[on other grounds], we take the opportunity to adopt the refinement
of that standard that was recently articulated by the United States
Supreme Court in [Twombly]. The Supreme Court ruled that the
often-quoted language in [Conley]—“a complaint should not be dismissed
for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the
plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would
entitle him to relief ”—had “earned its retirement.” The Court pointed
out that under Conley’s “no set of facts” standard, “a wholly conclusory
statement of claim would survive a motion to dismiss whenever the
pleadings left open the possibility that a plaintiff might later establish
some ‘set of [undisclosed] facts’ to support recovery.” As the Court
stated, “While a complaint attacked by a . . . motion to dismiss does not
need detailed factual allegations . . . a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the
‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and
conclusions . . . . Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to
relief above the speculative level . . . [based] on the assumption that all
the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact) . . . .”
What is required at the pleading stage are factual “allegations plausibly
suggesting (not merely consistent with)” an entitlement to relief, in
order to “reflect[] the threshold requirement . . . that the ‘plain statement’
possess enough heft to ‘sho[w] that the pleader is entitled to relief.’”
We agree with the Supreme Court’s analysis of the Conley language
. . . and we follow the Court’s lead in retiring its use. The clarified

45 See A. Benjamin Spencer, Pleading in State Courts After Twombly and Iqbal 20 (July 1, 2010)
(unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2038349 [http://perma.cc/
HLV4-27KJ] (“[I]f a notice-pleading jurisdiction has previously expressed its commitment to simplified
pleading for various policy reasons such as promoting access to justice, it should not treat Twombly
and Iqbal as undermining such policies in any way. Rather, those decisions reflect the Supreme
Court’s embrace of different policy concerns that states should feel free to discount when addressing
pleading in their own systems.”); see also Z.W. Julius Chen, Note, Following the Leader: Twombly,
Pleading Standards, and Procedural Uniformity, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1431, 1455 (2008) (urging states
without strong e-discovery regimes to consider their own state’s institutional concerns before
following Twombly).
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standard for rule 12(b)(6) motions adopted here will apply to any
amended complaint that the plaintiffs may file.46
This passage is remarkable. Before Twombly, Massachusetts courts had
adhered to Conley and its “no set of facts” formulation for thirty years without
deviation.47 Yet the court in Iannacchino was so anxious to follow the Supreme
Court that it adopted the momentous Twombly standard, without any consideration
of stare decisis, state law, state policies, or state practices. For Massachusetts,
the fact that the Supreme Court said it was enough.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court, in a case called Data Key Partners, also
adopted the Twombly “plausibility” standard,48 despite Wisconsin’s long
previous adherence to the Conley “no set of facts” standard.49 As in Iannacchino,
the Wisconsin court recited the Twombly opinion and adopted it without
engaging in a state-specific policy analysis.50 In yet another example, the
Supreme Court of South Dakota adopted the Twombly pleading standard
merely because the federal rule and the state rule both require a “showing” of
entitlement to relief but offered no reasoning based on state policy.51
These state courts were caught in the Supreme Court’s gravitational pull.
They followed Twombly primarily because the Supreme Court decided it rather
than because they exercised rigorous independent judgment in accordance with
state law and policy.
Exercising rigorous independent judgment based on appropriate state
considerations should not have been difficult. For example, the Supreme
Judicial Court of Maine adopted the Twombly standard after noting that the
federal and state rules were practically identical.52 The court then determined
that the rationale of Twombly applied to the kind of civil-perjury claims at
46
47

888 N.E.2d 879, 889-90 (Mass. 2008) (alterations in original) (internal citations omitted).
See Dodson, supra note 10, at 18 (noting that the Massachusetts courts “had followed the ‘no
set of facts’ standard of Conley for more than 30 years” until Iannacchino).
48 See Data Key Partners v. Permira Advisers LLC, 849 N.W.2d 693, 701 (Wis. 2014)
(concluding that the Twombly standard is consistent with Wisconsin state law precedent and
therefore requiring that plaintiffs allege facts that plausibly suggest they are entitled to relief).
49 See, e.g., Doe v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 700 N.W.2d 180, 186-87 (Wis. 2005) (citing
Wisconsin precedent that stands for the proposition that a court should not dismiss a plaintiff ’s
claims “unless it appears to a certainty” that the plaintiff cannot prove “any set of facts” that would
entitle him to relief).
50 The court suggested that Twombly was consistent with Wisconsin precedent, but that
assertion rings hollow given the Wisconsin courts’ long adherence to Conley and the novelty of the
“plausibility” standard. See Data Key Partners, 849 N.W.2d at 699-701.
51 See Sisney v. Best Inc., 754 N.W.2d 804, 808-09 (S.D. 2008) (pointing to the language of the
South Dakota statute that contains the State’s pleading requirements, and based on two words in
that statute, deciding to adopt the Supreme Court’s “new standards”).
52 See Bean v. Cummings, 939 A.2d 676, 680 (Me. 2008) (explaining that the court will use
constructions of a federal rule as aids in construing the state provision if a Maine Rule of Civil
Procedure is identical to the federal rule).
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issue and that the Twombly standard was needed to further the state policy of
curbing abusive use of those claims.53 And the Supreme Court of Nebraska
offered a defensible assessment of federal pleading standards and their
desirability in Nebraska courts.54
Yet although the Maine and Nebraska decisions did more than rely on the
mere pronouncement of the Supreme Court, their timing suggests they were
not truly independent. As I have written previously, “It is highly suspicious
that, after 50 years of adherence to Conley, these state courts happened to
conclude independently—just after the Supreme Court did—that their
pleading rules require New Pleading strictures, too.”55
The gravitational force of federal law is not irresistible; several state
supreme courts have rejected Twombly and Iqbal.56 But these instances of
resistance actually confirm the Supreme Court’s gravitational pull. Compare,
for example, the perfunctory and facile adoption of the federal pleading
change in Massachusetts, Wisconsin, and South Dakota,57 with the rejection
of the new federal standard by the Supreme Court of Tennessee in a discussion
spanning a dozen pages in Webb.58 That the Tennessee Supreme Court spilled
so much ink resisting the Supreme Court shows the strength of the Court’s
gravitational pull. Further, the Tennessee court’s opinion devotes several pages

53 See id. at 680 (adopting the Twombly standard for Maine civil perjury cases because “[o]n
certain subjects understood to raise a high risk of abusive litigation, a plaintiff must state factual
allegations with greater particularity than Rule 8 requires”).
54 See Doe v. Bd. of Regents, 788 N.W.2d 264, 274-78 (Neb. 2010) (explaining that “the
Nebraska Rules of Pleading in Civil Cases are modeled after the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,”
and concluding, after discussion, that the Twombly standard provides a balanced approach for
determining the sufficiency of a complaint).
55 See Dodson, supra note 10, at 17. One exception is the District of Columbia, which is required
by federal statute to follow federal precedent for like-worded rules. See D.C. CODE § 11-946 (2014)
(requiring the District of Columbia’s Superior Court to conduct its business in accordance with the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure unless the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals approves the Superior Court’s modification of those federal rules); see also
Potomac Dev. Corp. v. District of Columbia, 28 A.3d 531, 543 (D.C. 2011) (following the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure pleading standard in light of D.C. Code § 11-946); Behradrezaee v. Dashtara, 910
A.2d 349, 356 n.8 (D.C. 2006) (“We construe rules that are substantially identical to the corresponding
federal rule in light of the meaning given to the federal rule.”).
56 See, e.g., Cullen v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 189 P.3d 344, 346-48 (Ariz. 2008); Hawkeye
Foodservice Distrib., Inc. v. Iowa Educators Corp., 812 N.W.2d 600, 608-09 (Iowa 2012); Walsh v.
U.S. Bank, N.A., 851 N.W.2d 598, 603 (Minn. 2014); Webb v. Nashville Area Habitat for Humanity,
Inc., 346 S.W.3d 422, 430 (Tenn. 2011); Colby v. Umbrella, Inc., 955 A.2d 1082, 1086 n.1 (Vt. 2008);
McCurry v. Chevy Chase Bank, FSB, 233 P.3d 861, 863-64 (Wash. 2010); Roth v. DeFelicecare, Inc.,
700 S.E.2d 183, 189 n.4 (W. Va. 2010).
57 See discussion supra notes 46–51.
58 346 S.W.3d at 425-37.
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to exhaustively criticizing the Supreme Court’s standard on its own terms.59
This is curious because Twombly and Iqbal need not be wrong on their own
terms for them to be wrong for Tennessee. Questioning the federal decisions on
their own terms weakened their force and better enabled state court resistance.
The Minnesota Supreme Court’s recent rejection of Twombly in Walsh is
similar.60 The court noted that the similarities between federal and state law
made the Supreme Court’s views “‘instructive’ but not binding” and proceeded
to reject plausibility on state textual and policy grounds.61 The analysis is
thorough, careful, and exceptionally detailed. But, like the Tennessee case,
Walsh is notable for how much effort it spends discussing, analyzing, and
distinguishing the federal precedents.
Thus, even examples of state resistance reveal a federal gravitational force.
Perhaps the only true exception comes from the Iowa Supreme Court, which
simply put the burden on the party advocating for the federal change to
demonstrate that the change was warranted.62 In that case, the defendants had
neither “presented this court with any evidence that our state court system is
facing the sort of systemic pressures that contributed to the Supreme Court’s
decisions in Twombly and Iqbal,” and neither party “addressed countervailing
policy considerations that may exist” but instead “rel[ied] only on the similarities
between the federal rule and the Iowa rule.”63 The court concluded: “Based
on this record, there is an insufficient basis to make such an important change
in our rules.”64
Iowa is a lone outlier in a set of examples that illustrates the substantial
default effect that the Supreme Court’s interpretation of federal rules has on state
courts construing analogous state rules. Those state courts that follow simply
go with the flow. State courts that resist struggle to do so. The reason is the same:
the gravitational force of the Supreme Court’s decisions pulls them in.

59 See id. at 430-31 (concluding that the federal Twombly standard substantively departed from
the Supreme Court’s prior interpretation of this pleading standard, causing “a loss of clarity, stability,
and predictability in federal pleadings practice”).
60 Walsh, 851 N.W.2d at 600.
61 See id. at 603. The Minnesota Supreme Court had also favorably cited to Twombly and Iqbal
previously. See Bahr v. Capella Univ., 788 N.W.2d 76, 80 (Minn. 2010) (holding that “[a] plaintiff
must provide more than labels and conclusions” and citing Twombly for that proposition); Hebert v.
City of Fifty Lakes, 744 N.W.2d 226, 235 (Minn. 2008) (citing Twombly for the proposition that a
plaintiff ’s foundation for relief must be based on more than legal conclusions).
62 Hawkeye Foodservice Distrib., Inc. v. Iowa Educators Corp., 812 N.W.2d 600, 608 (Iowa 2012).
63 Id.
64 Id. I do not mean to express a normative preference for Iowa’s approach. Indeed, Iowa could
be criticized for failing to take the opportunity to engage the Supreme Court’s opinions in an effort
to approach its own state question with newly opened eyes. I only note that the very idea that a
nonbinding Supreme Court decision should open state courts’ eyes reflects the phenomenon that I
mean to show.
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b. State Conformity Under Dissimilar Rules
The gravitational pull of federal law can be so forceful that state courts
follow federal courts even when the language of their state rules is different
from the language of federal rules. Pleading standards again present a useful
example, for Rule 8 and its federal interpretation have exerted a strong
gravitational pull even on states that retained code pleading.65
A useful 2001 study by Thom Main illustrates this phenomenon. Main
studied the way state courts in code-pleading states reacted to federal court
interpretations of federal rules on pleading and summary judgment.66 Main
selected states whose rules were among those least influenced by the federal
rules.67 In Illinois, Main found “persuasive evidence of substantial intra-state
uniformity, notwithstanding the fundamental differences between code
pleading . . . and notice pleading,”68 as well as evidence that Illinois state
courts followed the Supreme Court’s interpretive gloss on pleading and
summary judgment under the Federal Rules.69 Main also found similar
following in Pennsylvania.70 Further, both states marched in tune—with
relatively consistent lag times—with the federal changes to summary judgment
after Celotex,71 despite different summary-judgment rule texts.72 And Edward
Cavanaugh has reported that state appellate courts in New York—a codepleading state—are using the Supreme Court’s “plausibility” standard even
though it applies only to pleadings in federal court.73
Note how the Supreme Court’s gravitational pull on state courts compounds
the overall gravitational effect of federal law. The federal rules pull state
rulemakers toward parallel state rules in the first instance, resulting in rampant
65 See Chen, supra note 45, at 1440 & n.65 (noting the code-pleading states Florida, Louisiana,
and Nebraska followed the pleading rules articulated by the Supreme Court in Conley).
66 Main, supra note 20, at 326-29.
67 Id. at 326-27.
68 Id. at 344-45.
69 Id. at 344.
70 Id. at 353.
71 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
72 Id. at 364-68. Main’s findings in a third code-pleading state, Nebraska, were different. There,
both state and federal courts appeared to adhere to fact pleading even after Leatherman v. Tarrant
County, 507 U.S. 163 (1993). Id. at 359. In addition, Nebraska specifically rejected Celotex in 1995,
even though the state rule was identical to the federal rule. Id. at 369-70. I discuss these implications
in Part III.
73 Edward D. Cavanagh, The Impact of Twombly on Antitrust Actions Brought in the State Courts,
ANTITRUST SOURCE, Feb. 2013, at 1, 7 (“Although the New York Court of Appeals did not cite
Twombly, the decision is unquestionably Twombly-esque in two important respects. First, the court
asserts that to survive a motion to dismiss, an antitrust claim must be ‘plausible.’ Second, the court
undertook the kind of detailed vetting of the complaint that Twombly demands. While New York’s
highest court has not specifically addressed the question of how Twombly bears on state court
pleading requirements, Equitas would appear to put New York in the Twombly camp.”).
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mimicry. Even when state rulemakers do resist, state courts are still drawn to
interpret divergent state rules in a manner that approaches the interpretation
of the federal rules. The overall effect amplifies the gravitational force of
federal law.
3. Other Procedural Rules
The gravitational force of federal procedural law extends to other procedural
regimes. More than forty states mimic the Federal Rules of Evidence,74 and
states often follow the Supreme Court’s gloss on those rules, such as its
controversial Daubert decision regarding the admissibility of expert
testimony.75 State following is pervasive in evidence law even in the few nonreplica states.76 Likewise, roughly half the states have modeled their own rules
of criminal procedure on the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.77 This
broader landscape suggests that the same gravitational pull of federal law affects
a wide swath of procedural rules.
B. Substantive Areas
The gravitational pull of federal law is not restricted to matters of procedure.
I also find evidence of a gravitational pull in both statutory law and constitutional
law. In using these examples, I do not mean to suggest that states always follow
federal substantive law. As with procedure, such a position is manifestly
74 See 6 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE,
at T-1 (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., 2d ed. 2011).
75 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). Before Daubert, almost all of
the states followed the seventy-year-old federal standard articulated in Frye v. United States, 293 F.
1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). Within six years, nineteen states had switched to the standard articulated in
Daubert. See Stephen Mahle, The Impact of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., on Expert
Testimony: With Applications to Securities Litigation, FLA. B.J., Mar. 1999, at 3, 36.
76 See, e.g., People v. Falsetta, 986 P.2d 182, 192-93 (Cal. 1999) (interpreting California’s
propensity-evidence bar for sex-crime prosecutions similarly to the Federal Rules of Evidence,
despite textual dissimilarities). See generally Alex Stein, Constitutional Evidence Law, 61 VAND. L.
REV. 65, 105-24 (2008) (arguing that state judges interpret state rules of evidence similarly to how
the Supreme Court interprets the Federal Rules of Evidence in order to make what appears to be
the correct decision and to further their reputation).
77 See, e.g., State v. Crowe, 168 S.W.3d 731, 741 n.3 (Tenn. 2005) (“The Tennessee Rules were
patterned after the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.”). For surveys, see 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE
ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 1.2(f), at 50 (2d ed. 1999) (“Roughly half of the states have court
rules of criminal procedure or statutory codes of criminal procedure that borrow heavily from the
Federal Rules.”); Jerold Israel, Federal Criminal Procedure as a Model for the States, 543 ANN. AM.
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 130, 138 n.18 (1996) (identifying Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Delaware,
Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana,
North Dakota, Ohio, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington,
West Virginia, and Wyoming as states with court rules or statutory codes modeled on the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure).
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untenable; counterexamples abound.78 But by documenting varied and
unexpected instances of uncoerced state following, I bring to light the
potential breadth of the gravitational pull of federal law.
1. Statutes: Employment Discrimination
Federal employment-discrimination law—primarily Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), and the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)—has inspired copycat state statutory
regimes, and developments in federal case law quickly echo in state jurisprudence.
That is true even though there are differences in the drafting histories of
federal and state employment-discrimination laws, and even though state
policies might differ markedly from federal policies.79
Of course, the social and legal push to outlaw employment discrimination
was, in that era, made at both the federal and state levels, so it is unsurprising
that this common cause would produce both federal and state employmentdiscrimination reform in roughly the same time period. But that explanation
is satisfactory only at a general level. Even for a common cause such as the
prohibition of employment discrimination, one would expect state-specific
policy preferences and local cultures to affect both the timing and the details
of how the states implemented their solutions.
Yet the degree of state following is surprising not only in timing but also in
detail. States generally tended to act shortly after the federal statutes passed,
and with a high level of mimicry. Prior to Title VII’s passage in 1964, states
were not very successful in combating employment discrimination.80 After
Title VII, most states swiftly and successfully enacted laws substantially
mirroring Title VII’s provisions.81 States also quickly followed the federal
ADEA (1967) and ADA (1990) with their own state protections drawn from the
78 See, e.g., Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for a Third
Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 9 (1988) (acknowledging that “[u]nemployment compensation,
minimum-wage laws, public financing of political campaigns, no-fault insurance, hospital cost
containment, and prohibitions against discrimination in housing and employment all originated in
state legislatures”); Steele & Tsoflias, supra note 6, at 1375 (identifying some states with broader
constitutional protections of civil liberties, including free speech and privacy rights); Benjamin J.
Beaton, Note, Walking the Federalist Tightrope: A National Policy of State Experimentation for Health
Information Technology, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1670, 1688-93 (2008) (surveying some of the various
health information initiatives that states implemented in the absence of federal action).
79 For an introduction to the relationship between state and federal employment-discrimination
laws, see generally Alex B. Long, “If the Train Should Jump the Track . . .”: Divergent Interpretations of State
and Federal Employment Discrimination Statues, 40 GA. L. REV. 469 (2006); Sandra F. Sperino, Revitalizing
State Employment Discrimination Law, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 545 (2013).
80 See Long, supra note 79, at 477 (“State attempts to address employment discrimination were
generally seen as failures at the time of Title VII’s enactment in 1964.”).
81 See Sally F. Goldfarb, The Supreme Court, the Violence Against Women Act, and the Use and Abuse
of Federalism, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 57, 91 (2002) (“After Title VII was enacted, all of the states that
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federal provisions.82 As one commentator put it, “[F]ederal law has traditionally
set the standard for individual rights in the employment context, with state
legislatures and courts taking their cues from federal law.”83
It is true that some states added greater protections,84 and it is also true
that most states modified at least some of the federal language in deliberate
ways.85 But the extent of the similarities is striking. Aside from isolated pockets
of novelty, states have approached antidiscrimination lawmaking principally
by plagiarizing the federal statutes,86 with little legislative history revealing
why Congress’s particular wording should be so perfectly and universally apt
for different states.
Likewise, state judicial interpretations of state statutes have tended to track
federal interpretations of the federal statutes.87 One might expect some
interpretive similarities when statutory texts, histories, and goals are similar.88
But state courts typically conform to federal court interpretations of federal
statutes with relatively paltry analysis of countervailing considerations.89 Many
states even adhere to an asserted principle of construction that federal opinions
concerning federal law are highly persuasive, if not controlling, on the question
of the proper interpretation of a parallel state law.90 Indeed, “state courts

previously lacked antidiscrimination laws adopted them.”); Long, supra note 79, at 477 (“[I]t was not
until Title VII became law that a majority of states adopted their own antidiscrimination statutes.”).
82 See Goldfarb, supra note 81, at 91; Alex Long, State Anti-Discrimination Law as a Model for
Amending the Americans with Disabilities Act, 65 U. PITT. L. REV. 597, 628 (2004) (describing the
influence of the ADA on state antidiscrimination laws and concluding that “[t]he enactment of the
ADA has clearly had a strong influence on state antidiscrimination statutes and interpretive
regulations”). However, as Professor Sandra Sperino notes, there are differences in the processes of
enactment of state and federal statutes (for example, most state statutes were passed as a part of
omnibus bills). Sperino, supra note 79, at 558-61.
83 Long, supra note 79, at 478.
84 See Goldfarb, supra note 81, at 91 (noting that many state employment discrimination
statutes are considerably more protective of employees rights than the federal version).
85 See Sperino, supra note 79, at 561 (“[T]here is not a single state statute that contains the
same statutory language as the federal statutes, even when confining such consideration to
substantive, rather than procedural or administrative, problems.”).
86 See Long, supra note 79, at 473 (“[F]ederal and state antidiscrimination laws typically ran
parallel to one another. Indeed, in many instances, a state’s antidiscrimination statute was based
upon or used language almost identical to federal law.”).
87 Id. at 477. In addition, some state statutes require conforming interpretation with federal
precedent. Id.
88 See id.
89 Id.
90 See id. at 473 (asserting that, because state antidiscrimination statutes were often based on
federal law and because “federal decisional law concerning a parallel statute is highly persuasive,” state
appellate courts would often interpret their own state antidiscrimination statutes in the same manner
that federal courts had interpreted the parallel federal statute); Sperino, supra note 79, at 582-83
(considering the reasons state courts may defer to federal courts when interpreting their own state
antidiscrimination statutes, including the ideas that federal and state statutes in this area have a common
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sometimes appear to bend over backwards in construing state antidiscrimination
statutes in order to keep state and federal law on the same track.”91
For example, in 1973, the Supreme Court interpreted Title VII to require a
unique burden-shifting framework for establishing a prima facie case of
employment discrimination.92 Despite the fact that the Court’s framework was
pure judicial gloss on a federal statute, state courts promptly adopted the
burden-shifting framework for their own state statutes.93 A disagreement
among lower courts—including state courts—then developed as to whether the
framework involved a burden of production or a burden of persuasion.94 In
1993, the Supreme Court answered that the framework under federal law
involved a burden of production.95 Again, states promptly and uniformly
followed suit, even those that had previously imposed a burden of persuasion.96
Another example of state court following is the so-called “Faragher/Ellerth”
defense. In those cases, the Court was asked whether an employer could be liable
under Title VII to an employee harassed by coworkers.97 Rejecting traditional
common law agency principles as inconsistent with the policies and goals of
Title VII, the Court created a two-part affirmative defense for the employer
based on whether the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and remedy
any harassment, and whether the plaintiff unreasonably failed to take advantage
of any preventive or remedial opportunities provided by the employer.98 No
part of this affirmative defense is in Title VII; the Court simply fashioned a
new judicial rule of agency for the federal statutory term “employer.”99 Yet
despite this convoluted, federal-specific judicial gloss, and despite the availability
of a trove of traditional agency rules already developed by the states, states have
largely adopted the Court’s test for state Title VII analogues.100
goal and purpose, that federal courts have had more opportunity to consider antidiscrimination issues, and
that reading federal and state statutes together is the only practical method).
91 Long, supra note 79, at 477.
92 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-03 (1973).
93 See Long, supra note 79, at 487-88.
94 See id.
95 St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 499, 506-07 (1993).
96 Long, supra note 79, at 487-88.
97 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 780 (1998); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth,
524 U.S. 742, 746-47 (1998).
98 Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
99 See Sperino, supra note 79, at 573 (“The words ‘tangible employment action’ do not appear
in Title VII; nor does the two-part affirmative defense created by the Supreme Court. Faragher and
Ellerth do not represent pure statutory interpretation of Title VII. Rather, in these cases, the
Supreme Court has created, using common law-type reasoning, a federal law of agency for Title VII
that is not dependent on the statutory language.” (footnotes omitted)).
100 See id. at 573 (“In cases where the federal courts are gap filling federal statutes using
common law reasoning, there is greater reason to be skeptical about importing these concepts into
state law. Nonetheless, courts interpreting state employment discrimination statutes have applied
the agency analysis created in Faragher and Ellerth.”)
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As with pleading rules, the lure of statutory following is powerful even
when the text of the state statute differs meaningfully from the federal
statute.101 California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) defines
“disability” in a significantly different way than the federal ADA: the ADA
requires that a disability “substantially limit[]” an individual while the FEHA
requires only a limitation.102 Federal courts concluded that the term
“substantially” in the ADA imposed a meaningful restriction on the type of
disability eligible under the ADA.103 Yet despite the absence of “substantially”
in the FEHA, California courts repeatedly interpreted the FEHA the same
as the ADA, even relying on federal ADA cases for support.104 Eventually,
the California legislature had to pass a “we really meant it” amendment to
the statute to make the proper standard—no substantiality was needed—
clear.105 Such was the strength of the gravitational pull of the ADA.
Such egregious examples exist throughout employment law. After the
Supreme Court held that Title VII’s statute of limitations began to run when
the discriminatory act occurred,106 Congress abrogated the Court’s decision by
amending the statute of limitations to begin to run when the individual is
affected.107 Nevertheless, courts of several states whose legislatures failed to
enact a similar amendment interpreted their state statutes of limitations as if
they had been amended like Title VII.108 Even in the face of nonconforming
state law, federal law pulls the states.
Of course, the gravitational force of federal law is not irresistible, and state
courts have not always blindly followed federal antidiscrimination precedent.109
For example, although many state courts followed the controversial Supreme
Court decision in Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.,110 which held that a person
101 See Long, supra note 79, at 495 (documenting state court interpretations that “finesse the
textual differences where they exist”).
102 See id. at 509-10 (“Rather than defining disabilities in terms of substantial limitations, the
FEHA simply spoke of limitations of major life activities. As numerous federal courts had concluded
that Congress’s inclusion of the word ‘substantially’ worked to limit dramatically the scope of the
ADA’s definition, this difference should have been significant.”).
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 See id. at 509 (“Ultimately, the California legislature stepped in with an amendment that
restated the obvious in no uncertain terms: notwithstanding any inconsistent interpretation, the
legislature intended state law to require a limitation rather than a substantial limitation.”).
106 Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 622 (2007).
107 Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111–2, 123 Stat. 5.
108 See, e.g., Summy-Long v. Penn. St. Univ., No. 1:06-cv-1117, 2010 WL 1253472, at *11 (M.D.
Pa. Mar. 24, 2010) (“PHRA should still be interpreted consistently with Title VII despite Title VII’s
change in language.”), rev’d on other grounds, 2010 WL 4514312 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 2, 2010).
109 See Long, supra note 79, at 473-74 (admitting that “a number of state appellate courts in
recent years have declined to follow federal court interpretations of employment discrimination
statutes when dealing with their own parallel state statutes”).
110 527 U.S. 471 (1999).
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with a disability that could be corrected (such as by wearing eyeglasses) was
not disabled within the meaning of the ADA, a few state courts have diverged.111
In Dahill v. Police Department of Boston,112 the Massachusetts high court refused
to follow Sutton because: (1) the state legislative history was different from
the ADA’s legislative history; (2) the Massachusetts agency charged with
interpreting and enforcing the state law had concluded that corrective measures
should not be considered, and that interpretation was entitled to substantial
deference by state courts; and (3) the state statute specifically directed courts
to construe the statute liberally in favor of disabled persons.113 But, as in other
areas, even counterexamples like Dahill are suggestive of the gravitational pull
of federal law. To reach its decision—a pure question of state law—the
Massachusetts court need not have cited Sutton at all; yet it felt compelled to
spend considerable effort to distinguish and distance Sutton.114
2. Constitutions: Bowers
Federal constitutional law has long exerted a pervasive pull on state
constitutional law.115 However, given the nature of constitutional law, state
constitutional following is particularly puzzling. Constitutional law often
involves sensitive and important policy matters, on which local preferences tend
to be stronger, more unified, and more extreme than national preferences.116
111 See Long, supra note 79, at 510-17 (describing how some state courts followed Sutton, while
others diverged).
112 748 N.E.2d 956 (Mass. 2001).
113 Id. at 959-64.
114 Id. at 963.
115 See, e.g., Lawrence Friedman, Path Dependence and the External Constraints on Independent
State Constitutionalism, 115 PENN. ST. L. REV. 783, 783 (2011) (asserting that the promise of
independent state constitutionalism “has gone largely unfulfilled”); Robert F. Williams, Methodology
Problems in Enforcing State Constitutional Rights, 3 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 143, 165 (1986-1987)
(recognizing the “often unstated premise that United States Supreme Court interpretations of the
federal Bill of Rights are presumptively correct for interpreting analogous state provisions”). Of
course, the earliest constitutional law follower was the federal Bill of Rights, which drew from
various state constitutions and colonial experiences. See William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions
and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 501-02 (1977) (“[T]he drafters of the
federal Bill of Rights drew upon corresponding provisions in the various state constitutions . . . .
And prior to the adoption of the fourteenth amendment, these state bills of rights, independently
interpreted, were the primary restraints on state action since the federal Bill of Rights had been held
inapplicable.”). For more information, see generally JAMES A. GARDNER, INTERPRETING STATE
CONSTITUTIONS: A JURISPRUDENCE OF FUNCTION IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM (2005), LEONARD
W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1999); DONALD S. LUTZ, THE ORIGINS OF
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM (1988); ROBERT ALLEN RUTLAND, THE BIRTH OF THE BILL
OF RIGHTS, 1776-1791 (1962). But, since then, state constitutions have tended to follow the U.S.
Constitution rather than vice versa.
116 See Justin Long, Intermittent State Constitutionalism, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 41, 52 (2006) (noting
the theory “that state constitutions are the repositories of the authoring community’s fundamental
values”). But see GARDNER, supra note 115, at 53-79 (contesting the theory that state values have
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Further, state constitutions have a different history and erect a different
governmental structure than the federal Constitution. Finally, constitutional
governance is the most prominent feature of popular sovereignty, a cherished
American ideal.117 These factors suggest that states should exercise independence
in state constitutionalism, relying on the preferences of their particular populaces,
with sensitivity to the nuances of their state governmental structures.
Yet state constitutional autonomy has not materialized.118 Instead, all states
have declarations of rights that track the federal Bill of Rights,119 sometimes
with a startling degree of mimicry.120 Likewise, state court interpretations of
state constitutions have tended to follow federal court interpretations of the
U.S. Constitution,121 even to the point of adopting the Supreme Court’s tests
sufficient intrastate homogeneity and interstate heterogeneity to be strong forces of constitutional
variation); James A. Gardner, Southern Character, Confederate Nationalism, and the Interpretation of
State Constitutions: A Case Study in Constitutional Argument, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1219, 1227 (1998)
(concluding that cultural distinctions between the South and the rest of America make no difference
for state constitutional interpretation).
117 See GORDON WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 340-80
(1969) (discussing the transformation of the American political system between the Declaration of
Independence and the U.S. Constitution).
118 See James A. Gardner, Autonomy and Isomorphism: The Unfulfilled Promise of Structural
Autonomy in American State Constitutions, 60 WAYNE L. REV. 31, 34 (2014) (noting that “state
constitutions tend to converge strongly with one another and with the U.S. Constitution”).
119 See Joseph Blocher, Reverse Incorporation of State Constitutional Law, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 323,
332-33 (2011) (“Every state has a bill of rights, and almost all of them reproduce in some form or
another the full list of rights protected by the federal Bill of Rights.”). It is true that states also have
constitutionalized rights that the U.S. Constitution does not, such as the right to a public education.
See JOHN J. DINAN, THE AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION (2006) (presenting a
comprehensive study of the 114 state constitutional conventions with recorded debates); A. E. Dick
Howard, State Courts and Constitutional Rights in the Day of the Burger Court, 62 VA. L. REV. 873, 917
(1976) (noting that at the time of publication, “forty-two state constitutions direct the legislature to
establish a system of schools”). State constitutions are also frequently amended and highly detailed
charters of state government. See Mila Versteeg & Emily Zackin, American Constitutional Exceptionalism
Revisited, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 1641, 1644-45 (2014). But when state constitutions speak to rights also
protected by the U.S. Constitution, they usually follow the U.S. Constitution. Counterexamples
tend to be in constitutional criminal law. See, e.g., Brennan, supra note 115, at 500 (citing California’s
and Hawaii’s greater search protections, Michigan’s broader right to counsel, and South Dakota’s
and Maine’s broader jury-trial right). Yet even in criminal procedure, other states have been known
to follow federal constitutional interpretation. See, e.g., Rhoades v. State, 233 P.3d 61, 65-66 (Idaho
2010) (listing state cases that follow the Supreme Court’s non-retroactivity rule of Teague v. Lane,
489 U.S. 288 (1989)).
120 Compare, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 4 (“The Legislature shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion.”), with U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting
an establishment of religion . . . .”). See generally Friedman, supra note 115, at 790 (“Textual variations
in individual rights provisions are often slight.”).
121 See ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, THE LAW OF AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONS 194-95
(2009) (analyzing the nature and function of state constitutions by contrast to the federal
Constitution, including the judicial interpretation issues that arise under state constitutions and the
processes for their amendment and revision); Michael E. Solimine, Supreme Court Monitoring of State
Courts in the Twenty-First Century, 35 IND. L. REV. 335, 338 (2002) (“[S]ystematic studies demonstrate
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and interpretive methodologies.122 For example, nearly all states have
interpreted their equal protection guarantees to incorporate the same tiers of
scrutiny that the U.S. Supreme Court has developed for the federal Equal
Protection Clause.123 To be sure, pockets of state independence exist, such as
discrete areas of constitutional criminal law. 124 But, for the most part, state
courts construe their own state constitutional protections in lockstep with
the Supreme Court’s interpretation of analogous federal provisions, slavishly
incorporating the Supreme Court’s doctrinal standards and buzzwords.125
The result is an epidemic pathology in state constitutional law in which state
courts routinely choose to follow the reasoning of the U.S. Supreme Court,126
even when the state constitution purports to protect rights more broadly than
the U.S. Constitution.127 Some state courts even follow the U.S. Supreme
that most state courts, when presented with the opportunity, have chosen not to depart from federal
precedents when interpreting the rights-granting provisions of state constitutions. In other words,
the majority of state courts, on most issues, engage in an analysis in lockstep with their federal
counterparts.” (citations omitted)).
122 Blocher, supra note 119, at 334 (“Despite their formal interpretive independence, state courts
have generally followed the Supreme Court’s lead, adopting its tests and doctrines as their own.”). The
impetus of state court following is, for the most part, judicially sui generis, though it is constitutionally
mandated in a few states. See Thomas C. Marks, Jr., Federalism and the Florida Constitution: The Self-Inflicted
Wounds of Thrown-Away Independence from the Control of the U.S. Supreme Court, 66 ALB. L. REV. 701, 70105 (2003) (noting that Florida’s constitution directs its state courts to follow the Supreme Court’s
interpretation of the U.S. Constitution’s Fourth and Eighth Amendments, even when the state courts are
adjudicating claims solely under the Florida constitution).
123 See, e.g., Robotham v. State, 488 N.W.2d 533, 539 (Neb. 1992) (“The Nebraska Constitution
has identical requirements [to the Equal Protection Clause].”). See generally JEFFREY M. SHAMAN,
EQUALITY AND LIBERTY IN THE GOLDEN AGE OF STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 15-44 (2008)
(discussing states’ application of “the federal model of equality”); Christopher R. Leslie, Embracing
Loving: Trait-Specific Marriage Laws and Heightened Scrutiny, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 1077, 1086 (2014)
(noting that most state courts apply the Supreme Court’s tiers of scrutiny in evaluating equal
protection claims).
124 See Donald E. Wilkes, Jr., More on the New Federalism in Criminal Procedure, 63 KY. L.J. 873,
873-75 (1975) (discussing the trend of state courts evading Supreme Court review through the
“doctrine of adequate state grounds” by “basing [their] judgment[s] on [] state right[s] which [are]
coextensive with or broader than rights afforded by federal law”).
125 See Blocher, supra note 119, at 339 (“[E]ither from force of habit, mistaken belief that they
were bound by the federal rules, lack of expertise, or simply because they agreed with the Burger
Court’s reasoning, most state courts continued to apply their own constitutional provisions in
lockstep with federal analogues.”).
126 See Williams, supra note 115, at 165 (asserting that the “often unstated premise that United
States Supreme Court interpretations of the federal Bill of Rights are presumptively correct for
interpreting analogous state provisions . . . . exerts a significant amount of intuitive force upon
lawyers and judges grappling with problems of state constitutional interpretation”); id. at 152 (arguing
that when a state constitution mirrors the U.S. Constitution, a Supreme Court interpretation of the
federal provision “cast[s] a confusing ‘shadow’ over the interpretation of the analogous state
constitutional provision”).
127 See Jason Mazzone, When the Supreme Court is Not Supreme, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 979, 105960 (2010) (citing JEFFREY M. SHAMAN, EQUALITY AND LIBERTY IN THE GOLDEN AGE OF STATE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 243 (2008)) (arguing that while there are times when courts expand rights
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Court’s reasoning as an express matter of course. For example, the Nebraska
Supreme Court has stated that the guarantee of freedom of speech is the same
under both the Nebraska Constitution and the U.S. Constitution, and it
adopted the policy of following the reasoning and analytical framework of the
Supreme Court to interpret the guarantee under its own state constitution.128
Other state courts recognize their ability to depart from federal court
reasoning but erect doctrinal barriers to exercising that ability. For example,
Washington presumptively follows nonbinding federal court decisions unless
contrary considerations override that presumption, such as differing text, differing
history, differing structure, preexisting state law, and matters of particular state
or local concern.129 This model essentially codifies the federal gravitational pull:
go with the flow unless some countervailing force enables resistance.
Consider the implications of the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1986 opinion in
Bowers v. Hardwick, which upheld the constitutionality of a Georgia statute
criminalizing sodomy.130 The Court found no fundamental right to engage in
sodomy and therefore found Georgia’s statutory prohibition valid under the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.131 By rejecting a rightsexpansive construction of the U.S. Constitution, Bowers left state courts free
based on state constitutions, this remains outside of the norm); see also Ronald L.K. Collins, Rebirth
of Reliance on State Charters; A Fresh Look at Old Issues, NAT’L L.J., Mar. 12, 1984, at 25-32 (cataloguing
several hundred state cases between 1974 and 1984 where state courts provided more rights under
their state constitutions than had been provided under the U.S. Constitution). For a comparison of
the protections provided by state constitutions versus the protections provided by the federal
Constitution, see WILLIAMS, supra note 121, at 113-34.
128 Pick v. Nelson, 528 N.W.2d 309, 317 (Neb. 1995) (“[W]e do not distinguish between the two
constitutions in our analysis of this issue.”); cf. Robotham v. State, 488 N.W.2d 533, 539 (Neb. 1992)
(treating the state and federal rights to privacy as indistinguishable because “[n]o Nebraska case
recognizes a right to privacy, based on our Constitution, broader than the narrow federal
constitutional right”).
129 See Linda White Atkins, Note, Federalism, Uniformity, and the State Constitution—State v.
Gunwall, 106 Wn. 2d 54, 720 P.2d 808 (1986), 62 WASH. L. REV. 569, 578-80 (1987) (listing the six
criteria the Gunwall court used to decide when outcomes should be different based on a state
constitution: textual language, significant differences in provisions, state constitutional and common
law history, preexisting state law, differences in the structure of Constitutions, and matters of particular
state or local concern). This paradigm is the inverse of that urged by Justice Brennan:
[S]tate court judges, and also practitioners, do well to scrutinize constitutional
decisions by federal courts, for only if they are found to be logically persuasive and
well-reasoned, paying due regard to precedent and the policies underlying specific
constitutional guarantees, may they properly claim persuasive weight as guideposts
when interpreting counterpart state guarantees.
Brennan, supra note 115, at 502.
478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). In using
Bowers as an illustration, I in no way mean to imply that all of constitutional law can be reduced to
this particular, or even some other particular, issue. Bowers merely illustrates how the general
phenomenon of the federal constitutional gravitational force operates.
131 Id.
130
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to construe their own state constitutions more broadly in ways that would
invalidate state sodomy statutes on state constitutional grounds. But, by and
large, states did not. Rather, in the immediate aftermath of Bowers, states
tended to hew closely to the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Bowers when
interpreting their own constitutions.
States’ preference for following the Supreme Court’s reasoning had
interesting implications in Georgia because Georgia’s constitution confers state
privacy rights that are greater than those of the federal Constitution.132 Thus,
Georgia courts were free—even encouraged—to invalidate on state grounds the
very statute Bowers upheld on federal grounds. Yet in Christiansen v. State, the
Georgia Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of Georgia’s sodomysolicitation statute on state constitutional grounds.133 The state court could have
found the statute constitutional simply by relying on the Georgia constitution
and state court precedent. Instead the relatively short opinion relies primarily on
Bowers to find that “the proscription against sodomy is a legitimate and valid
exercise of state police power in furtherance of the moral welfare of the public.
Our constitution does not deny the legislative branch the right to prohibit such
conduct.”134 Other state courts construing sodomy statutes in the immediate
aftermath of Bowers treated it with similar gravitas.135
A few states did reject Bowers. In Commonwealth v. Wasson, the Kentucky
Supreme Court held Kentucky’s sodomy statute unconstitutional under its
state constitution.136 But even Wasson is evidence of Bowers’s pull. The Kentucky
132 GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, para. I; Christiansen v. State, 468 S.E.2d 188, 189 (Ga. 1996) (“[W]e
have determined that certain provisions of the 1983 Georgia Constitution confer greater rights and
benefits than the federal constitution.”).
133 Christiansen, 468 S.E.2d at 190 (“[The sodomy statute] does not violate the right to privacy
under the Georgia Constitution.”).
134 Id. at 190. But cf. id. at 191 n.1 (Sears, J., dissenting) (chastising the court for “incorrectly
consider[ing] Christiansen’s right to privacy argument in light of . . . Bowers”). Two years later, the
Georgia Supreme Court revisited the issue and held its sodomy statute to violate the state
constitutional right of privacy. See Powell v. State, 510 S.E.2d 18 (Ga. 1998). But, by then, the U.S.
Supreme Court had decided Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), which expanded gay rights,
indicating a shift in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence with which Powell was more consistent. For
a post-Bowers discussion, see infra text accompanying notes 210–23.
135 See, e.g., State v. Gray, 413 N.W.2d 107 (Minn. 1987) (relying on Bowers to find Minnesota’s
commercial-sodomy statute constitutional under the Minnesota constitution); In re Opinion of the
Justices, 530 A.2d 21, 27 (N.H. 1987) (“The third question posed by the legislature is whether the
proposed bill [banning same-sex couples from adopting] would violate any substantive right to privacy
under either the State or Federal Constitution. We answer that it would not, resting our determination
upon the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Bowers . . . .”); cf. State v. Smith, 766 So.2d 501,
508-10 (La. 2000) (relying on Bowers to find Louisiana’s sodomy-solicitation statute constitutional
under the Louisiana constitution). Of course, instances of true state independence exist. See, e.g.,
Campbell v. Sundquist, 926 S.W.2d 250. 259-61 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996) (holding Tennessee’s prohibition
on “Homosexual Acts” unconstitutional under the Tennessee Constitution while relying primarily on
state law and appropriately asserting that Bowers does not control).
136 842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1993).
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court discussed or quoted Bowers a dozen separate times throughout its
decision, both to distinguish the case and to attack it as wrongly decided.137
Further, the two dissents in Wasson extensively engage Bowers for support.138
The takeaway is that Bowers cast a long shadow in all three opinions. Wasson
purportedly was decided under the Kentucky state constitution, but the court
struggled mightily to adhere to state law and policy in the face of Bowers.
Bowers, of course, was not the last word on gay rights, and I will address
some of the post-Bowers developments in Part II.139 But Bowers was the last
rights-restrictive decision on gay rights issued by the Supreme Court, and,
despite its nonpreemptive status, for a decade it exerted a powerful force
against state expansion of gay rights.140
States’ voluntarily following of federal constitutional law, federal statutory
law, and federal procedural law illustrates the gravitational force of federal law. In
Part II, I theorize some explanatory vectors behind that gravitational force.
II. EXPLANATORY VECTORS
This Part considers the reasons behind federal law’s gravitational force
and why it is so persistent across different areas of the law and institutional
actors. The most benign explanation is that federal law gets the law right first,
and state actors, realizing this, follow as a matter of agreement and judgment.
Were this Swiftian ideal true,141 perhaps first-year law students (not to mention
distinguished federal judges) might be saved from the many tribulations of the
Erie doctrine.142
But common sense, localism, and history all undermine confidence that
federal law frequently gets things correct for the states. Further, states often
follow federal law without much explanation of their reasoning.143 When states
do explain, their explanation is almost always “because federal law says so.”144
137 Id. at 489-91, 493, 497-99 (“We view [Bowers] as a misdirected application of the theory of
original intent.”). The court purported to “discuss Bowers in particular, and federal cases in general,
not in the process of construing the United States Constitution or federal law, but only where their
reasoning is relevant to discussing questions of state law.” Id. at 489. But in fact, the court’s extensive
analysis of Bowers suggests that the court went far beyond what was necessary to decide the case
under the state constitution.
138 Id. at 503-09 (Lambert, J., dissenting); id. at 509-20 (Wintersheimer, J., dissenting).
139 See infra text accompanying notes 210–23.
140 See Matthew Coles, The Meaning of Romer v. Evans, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 1343, 1357 (1997)
(explaining how Bowers became the “five hundred pound gorilla of constitutional law and sexual
orientation” because of its status as governing law and its pervasive “tone”); Cary Franklin, Marrying
Liberty and Equality: The New Jurisprudence of Gay Rights, 100 VA. L. REV. 817, 832-34, 844-45, 851-57
(2014) (giving a broader overview of the gay rights movement beginning in the 1990s).
141 Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
142 Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
143 See supra Part I.
144 See supra Part I.
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This heavily contrasts with states’ detailed analyses for rejecting federal law.145
As a result, explanations for state isomorphism generally, and in specific instances,
need deeper theorizing.146 This Part unearths a number of practical and political
explanations for federal law’s gravitational pull on the states.147
A. Resource Conservation
Maintaining a workable legal system, which is a role co-performed by the
courts, can be both difficult and time consuming. Why reinvent the wheel? If
a federal institution adopts a workable (or at least defensible) regime or
interpretation of federal law, states could co-opt that solution with little effort
and expense. It is cognitively easier and simpler for states to follow a trodden
path of federal law than to blaze a new trail. Further, federal models offer a
non-diminishing public good that can be consumed equally and without
rivalry by all states. In a world where states have scarce resources, piggybacking
on the efforts and insights of federal actors seems sensible and even
economically desirable.
These practical pressures increase exponentially as they trickle down through
the legislation-interpretation process. If state lawmakers and rulemakers ride
on the coattails of the rigorous and detailed work of Congress and federal
rulemakers, they are likely to record less debate, perform less independent
factfinding, and produce less legislative and rulemaking history. When state
courts then confront interpretive questions, they lack the useful tools of
legislative or rulemaking study and history to which federal courts routinely
have access.148 The lack of independent state-based interpretative guidance

145
146

See supra Part I.
The sociological literature defines isomorphism as the tendency of like institutions to adopt
like organizational structures, often mimetically. For seminal work on non-optimizing isomorphism,
see Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell, The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and
Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields, 48 AM. SOC. REV. 147 (1983). The literature focuses on
organizational structure rather than the legal pronouncements of state and federal institutions,
though at least one study of horizontal state differentiation exists. See Frederick J. Boehmke &
Richard Witmer, Disentangling Diffusion: The Effects of Social Learning and Economic Competition on
State Policy Innovation and Expansion, 57 POL. RES. Q. 39 (2004) (highlighting that economic
competition diffusion affects both policy innovation and expansion).
147 I do not hazard guesses about specific explanations for specific instances of state following,
nor do I undertake the very complicated analyses for why some states follow a specific federal law
and others resist, or for establishing the conditions under which a specific state might follow. But
one aim of this Article is to set the theoretical framework for thinking about how further empirical
research might tackle those questions.
148 See Michael Esler, State Supreme Court Commitment to State Law, JUDICATURE, July–August
1994, at 25, 31 (“[T]he general lack of historical records on the events and forces that shaped state
constitutions creates problems for judges who wish to develop state laws.”); Mazzone, supra note 127,
at 1061 (“State judges have largely lacked the tools to develop an independent body of state
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increases the burdens on state courts to conduct independent analysis. At the
end of the day, perhaps state courts are simply relieved to have the opportunity
to crib from a learned and detailed federal opinion, even if the federal opinion
speaks only to federal law.
Further, because state courts are able to adjudicate matters of federal
law,149 plaintiffs can join analogous state and federal claims in one action. A
state judge confronting a case requiring adjudication of both federal and
analogous state law will find it far easier to dispose of both claims on the same
grounds than to differentiate between them, doubling time and effort. Of
course, savvy defendants may remove a state court action containing both
state and federal claims to federal court, or a plaintiff may file in federal court
originally.150 But the pressures on state judges to adjudicate analogous claims
under like standards will push federal judges in the same way: to apply federal
standards to analogous state claims. Either way, state law gets pulled into the
shadow of analogous federal law.
Resource conservation may help explain a great deal of state following in
the statutory and constitutional arenas.151 Because the Supreme Court is the
last and official word on the scope of the U.S. Constitution and on the
constitutionality, validity, and meaning of federal statutes, its interpretative
decisions on matters of federal law can be perceived by states to create a
presumption of validity for analogous state court decisions. In Bowers, for
example, the Supreme Court concluded that because homosexual sodomy was
not a “fundamental” right “deeply rooted” in the traditions of society, it was
not a right subject to “heightened scrutiny” by the U.S. Constitution.152 It is
no surprise that the Georgia Supreme Court took advantage of the ease of
applying this line of reasoning to its state sodomy-solicitation statute under
the Georgia Constitution.153 The Bowers opinion served up an easily traceable
pattern stamped with the Supreme Court’s approval. To write differently—
as the dissenting Georgia justices did—would have required much more effort

constitutional law.”). But see WILLIAMS, supra note 121, at 319 (contending that some “state
constitutional history is . . . much more available than federal constitutional history”).
149 Congress has excluded state jurisdiction in only a few areas of federal law. See, e.g., 28
U.S.C. § 1338 (2012) (granting exclusive original jurisdiction to federal district courts over civil suits
on patents, copyrights, and trademarks).
150 See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2012) (permitting defendants to remove a suit from state court to
federal court if the federal court has original jurisdiction over the suit).
151 See generally GARDNER, supra note 115, at 50 (arguing that the costs of state constitutional
following are low); Friedman, supra note 115, at 797 (theorizing that the costs of independent state
constitutional interpretation may be dauntingly high).
152 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191-92 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S.
558, 578 (2003).
153 See Christiansen v. State, 468 S.E.2d 188 (Ga. 1996).
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(as their much longer opinion suggests it did).154 The same cost-avoidance
tendency holds true for matters of statutory law.
This resource-conservation theory of state following might also explain some
instances of state procedural divergence. The states that least incorporate the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are primarily large, resource-rich, independently
minded states that can more easily absorb the cost of promulgating their own
rule systems.155 Even for traditional followers, the cost of repeat following
might exceed the cost of standing still if federal law changes too rapidly. This
may explain why replica states have not kept pace with the frequent changes
in the Federal Rules;156 it is easier for rulemakers to remain inert than to issue
conforming amendments every year.
B. Vertical Uniformity
An obvious rationale for state following is to reap the benefits of
uniformity. At the horizontal federal level, uniformity has long played a powerful
role in shaping federal institutional structure and jurisprudence.157 As Richard
Fallon argues, uniform treatment, interpretation, and application of federal law
are closely tied to notions of legal and governmental legitimacy.158 In perhaps an
overstatement, Thomas Wall Shelton, seeking passage of a bill to provide for
federal procedural uniformity, said, “[Uniformity is] so splendid, so beautiful
and so beneficial in every respect, as to command unstintedly the loving labor,
time and treasure of the best men of this marvelous age in which we live.”159
Vertical uniformity stands on somewhat different footing. Uniformity
within a single legal regime has a stronger case than uniformity across two
independent regimes. Nevertheless, vertical uniformity has long been considered
a jurisprudential virtue because it offers: (1) predictability within a particular
154
155

See id. at 190-99 (Sears, J, dissenting and Hunstein, J, dissenting).
Oakley & Coon, supra note 16, at 1426 (highlighting that states with large populations are
“less likely to have systematically modeled their civil procedures on the Federal Rules”).
156 Oakley, supra note 19, at 355. Still, it is noteworthy that even given the pressure to keep
pace, Oakley found that 66% of the five selected amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
from 1980 to 1991, and more than 25% of the 1993 federal amendments, were adopted by the states
studied. Id. at 382.
157 See Anthony J. Bellia Jr., State Courts and the Interpretation of Federal Statutes, 59 VAND. L. REV.
1501, 1553 (2006) (arguing that federal law should be uniformly interpreted in state and federal courts);
Erwin Chemerinsky & Larry Kramer, Defining the Role of the Federal Courts, 1990 BYU L. REV. 67, 83-84
(arguing that federal courts should strive for “uniformity in the interpretation and application of federal
law”); Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies,
104 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1812 n.451 (1991) (“[W]e do have a single federal judicial system in which
uniformity is a prominent aspiration.”). But see generally Amanda Frost, Overvaluing Uniformity, 94 VA. L.
REV. 1567 (2008) (questioning the virtues of horizontal federal uniformity).
158 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1787, 1794-96 (2005).
159 Thomas W. Shelton, Uniformity of Judicial Procedure and Decision, LAW STUDENT’S HELPER,
Oct. 1914, at 5, 9.
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geographic region; (2) simplicity, clarity, and efficiency by reducing variation;
(3) the appearance of neutrality; and (4) the enhancement of reputation by
evincing unanimity and consistency.160 Indeed, the prevalence of “uniform”
codes, “model” codes, and “restatements” designed to encourage uniformity
across fifty different sovereigns is a manifestation of law’s push toward uniformity
across independent regimes.161
In the procedural context in particular, “uniformity enjoys virtually universal
approval,”162 and one possible explanation for state procedural following is the
desire to promote vertical procedural uniformity within a state. States have no
power to change the procedure followed by federal courts in their states, and
federal actors are unlikely to dismantle the horizontal uniformity of federal
procedure in ways that allow federal procedure to mirror the various state
procedures.163 So a state that considers vertical uniformity important might
rationally seek to adopt state procedures that mimic federal procedures.
Vertical procedural uniformity surely has its benefits.164 Attorneys practicing
within a state need only learn one kind of procedure. The breadth of concurrent
subject-matter jurisdiction ensures that there will be some overlap between the
set of attorneys appearing before state courts and the set of attorneys appearing
before federal courts in their state. It is simpler and easier for attorneys, and
cheaper and less risky for clients, for the procedural rules among state and
federal courts within a single state to be uniform.165
160 See Main, supra note 20, at 311-12; see also Chen, supra note 45, at 1462-64 (justifying
procedural uniformity for reasons of “[p]redictability of result,” “[c]onsistent administration of
justice,” “[r]efinement and quality,” and “[c]ost and efficiency”).
161 For example, most states have modeled their professional ethics rules on the American Bar
Association’s nonbinding Model Rules of Professional Conduct. See MARGARET RAYMOND, THE
LAW AND ETHICS OF LAW PRACTICE 11 (2009) (noting that the ABA’s goal was to create a useful
template for jurisdictions and encourage uniformity). According to the ABA, “California is the only
state that does not have professional conduct rules that follow the format of the ABA Model Rules
of Professional Conduct.” Model Rules of Professional Conduct, ABA, http://www.abanet.org/cpr/
mrpc/model_rules.html [http://perma.cc/V37E-HVYB] (last visited Nov. 21, 2015).
162 Main, supra note 20, at 312.
163 Despite recognition that local rules and court discretion alloy the uniformity of federal
procedure, see infra note 173, and despite calls for limited rethinking of the transsubstantivity of
federal procedure, see, e.g., Stephen N. Subrin, Fudge Points and Thin Ice in Discovery Reform and the
Case for Selective Substance-Specific Procedure, 46 FLA. L. REV. 27 (1994), and despite sporadic
instances in which federal procedure incorporates state procedural rules, see, e.g., Semtek Int’l Inc.
v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497 (2001), no one advocates for a return to the era of the
Conformity Acts, which generally required a federal court to apply the state procedure applicable
in the state in which it sat, see Conformity Act of 1872, ch. 255 § 5, 17 Stat. 196, 197.
164 See Koppel, supra note 8, at 1174 (arguing that intrastate uniformity of discovery rules is a
desirable goal achievable through states’ willingness to follow federal procedure); Subrin, supra note
24, at 2001 (noting that the primary goal of uniform rules should be to resolve similar cases in an
efficient manner).
165 See, e.g., Koppel, supra note 8, at 1194 (“Civil litigation in state and federal courts is
increasingly national and international in scope, crossing state lines as well as national boundaries.
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Vertical procedural uniformity also inhibits vertical forum shopping. In
cases of concurrent subject-matter jurisdiction, either party usually can select
to litigate in federal court.166 Although the substantive law generally will be the
same in either forum, each forum applies its own procedure, which may induce
forum shopping for the most favorable procedure.167 The greater the degree of
uniformity between federal and state procedures, the less likely procedural
rules will be the basis for vertical forum-shopping by the parties.
The promise of these benefits offers some explanation for the state
procedural following observed in Part I. The proliferation of state procedural
rules mirroring the Federal Rules in the decades immediately following the
Federal Rules’ adoption is consistent with a desire to promote intrastate
procedural uniformity to simplify matters for the local bar and dissuade
vertical forum shopping. These goals are also consistent with the effort of
state courts that have followed the Supreme Court’s new pleading standards
and with Professor Main’s finding that state courts attempt to conform state
procedural practice to federal procedural practice, even when state rules differ
textually from federal rules.168
The realities of procedural uniformity also help explain some state
divergence from the federal lead. Vertical procedural uniformity is relatively
easy to achieve if federal procedure is static, or at least changes gradually and
predictably; it is far more difficult to maintain, as a practical and political matter,
if federal procedural changes are rapid, are numerous, are novel, or themselves
erode uniformity. Federal rulemakers are active; despite the difficulty of

For this reason, the aesthetic of the national procedural uniformity that produced the Federal Rules
in 1938 is even timelier today than it was in the first third of the Twentieth Century and is applicable
to both state and federal procedure.” (footnotes omitted)). But see Frost, supra note 157, at 1600
(arguing that “predictability and uniformity need not go hand-in-hand” and are not necessarily
compromised by variation in procedure).
166 There are some exceptions, such as substantive areas of exclusive jurisdiction and areas of
removal asymmetry. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (2012) (providing exclusive federal jurisdiction for
patents); id. § 1441(b) (prohibiting a forum defendant from removing a diversity case); Ankenbrandt
v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 701-03 (1992) (discussing states’ exclusive jurisdiction for the issuance of
marriages and divorces).
167 See, e.g., Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins., 559 U.S. 393 (2010). But cf. John
Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693, 710 (1974) (“[F]orum shopping is not
an evil per se. It is evil only if something evil flows from it . . . .”).
168 See Main, supra note 20, at 370-71 (theorizing that intrastate procedural uniformity may
arise despite differing rule texts because of the force of “local legal culture,” the “composite of shared
norms, experiences, expectations and values of lawyers, judges and other institutional forces . . .
that, while not necessarily reflected in the textual rules, nonetheless inhere in the standards that are
applied”); see also Oakley, supra note 19, at 384 (“It may be that the role of formal rules has been
exaggerated, and that ‘local legal culture’ is more important in determining how procedure works at
the grass roots level, whether in a federal courtroom or a state one.”).
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implementing dramatic rule amendments,169 the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure are amended almost every year, often in numerous ways, and some
of the amendments represent significant innovation (such as the waiver rule for
service under Rule 4 and the “safe harbor” provision of Rule 11).170 States are
hard-pressed to keep up, especially if interest groups with localized lobbying
power contest the procedural issues under consideration.171 States also may
genuinely wish to delay adopting proposed rules for a time to see how such
experimental rules play out, especially in today’s data-driven society. Further,
federal amendments have tended to favor judicial discretion and flexibility,
resulting in judge-specific and case-specific application of the rules in federal
court.172 The widespread adoption of local rules has eroded horizontal
uniformity on the federal level.173 As federal procedure moves away from its
origins, and as it cultivates disuniformity even among federal cases, the states’
ability to mimic federal procedure flags.174 The practical difficulty of keeping
up may help explain why, in recent years, state following at the rule level has
subsided. Like gravity itself, the linguistic and structural closeness of
procedural regimes within the same state exert attractive force. As the distance
of space and time widens, the attraction abates.175
169 See Mark R. Kravitz, To Revise, or Not to Revise: That Is the Question, 87 DENV. U. L. REV.
213, 216-17 (2010) (noting that amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are products of
time-consuming research, conferences, and hearings).
170 See, e.g., FED R. CIV. P. 4; FED R. CIV. P. 11.
171 See Koppel, supra note 8, at 1188 (observing the localized political influence of the
plaintiffs’ bar in state legislatures); Roger Michael Michalski, Tremors of Things to Come: The Great
Split Between Federal and State Pleading Standards, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 109, 113 (2010) (“Interest
groups lobby rulemakers and legislators to create or preserve procedural advantages. The political
successes of these interest groups further undermined national procedural uniformity.”).
172 See generally Richard L. Marcus, Slouching Toward Discretion, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1561 (2003).
173 Scholars have observed and lamented this fracturing of federal procedure. See Paul D.
Carrington, A New Confederacy? Disunionism in the Federal Courts, 45 DUKE L.J. 929, 937-38 (1996)
(noting increased “erosion of the final decision requirement” in federal courts that adopt local rules);
Koppel, supra note 8, at 1171-72 (recognizing widespread scholarly criticism of the “movement to
location” in federal procedure); Michalski, supra note 171, at 113 (detailing the detriment caused by
the divergence of pleading standards in state and federal courts); Subrin, supra note 24, at 2024-26
(suggesting that the adoption of local discovery limitations by federal courts may result in disparate
treatment of parties); Carl Tobias, A Civil Discovery Dilemma for the Arizona Supreme Court, 34 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 615, 615 (2002) (observing the accelerating number of procedural changes and growing
inconsistency of requirements caused by “the growing balkanization of federal civil procedure”);
Carl Tobias, Local Federal Civil Procedure for the Twenty-First Century, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 533,
579 (2002) (calling on the legislature to restore “the primacy of all federal rules that govern civil,
appellate, bankruptcy, criminal, and admiralty procedure”); see also WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 21, at
433 (arguing that the proliferation of local rules is a “threat to uniformity throughout the country”).
174 See Michalski, supra note 171, at 114 (observing that because uniformity is a path-dependent
good, initial state divergence makes further divergence more likely).
175 Cf. Oakley, supra note 19, at 355 (finding, in a 2002 survey of state procedural following in
the wake of FRCP amendments made between 1990 and 1993, that state rulemakers were less and
less likely to adopt state analogues to federal rule amendments). Still, it is noteworthy that even
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For these reasons, state interest in vertical procedural uniformity likely
plays some role in explaining both the general tendency of state actors to
mimic federal procedures and the increasing disinclination of state
rulemakers to follow recent federal procedural rule amendments.
For similar reasons, the quest for vertical uniformity may help explain
states’ tendency to follow substantive law. Statutory conformity avoids imposing
conflicting directives for primary actors and simplifies understanding of rights
and obligations.176 For example, Pennsylvania’s Human Relations Act contains
a term of art—“bona fide occupational qualification,” or BFOQ—which is also
found in Title VII.177 Pennsylvania state courts quickly decided to read the
act’s BFOQ definition in harmony with Title VII, though that conclusion was
not compelled by the text, explaining, “This is the only reasonable, workable
method, through hand-in-hand working of the state and federal government,
that will carry us to a practical interpretation of this important exception.”178
Vertical uniformity also shows commitment to a common cause in both
statutory and constitutional law. 179 Thus, for example, in employment
discrimination, state legislatures might choose to mimic Congress not
because they believe the precise language of a federal statute is the best
approach, but because mimicry enables states to claim equal footing with
federal law. Finally, state legislatures and judges might seek substantive
vertical uniformity in order to reduce forum shopping.180
For these reasons, state interest in vertical uniformity likely provides
some explanation for the gravitational force of federal law.
C. Familiarity and Focus
American legal traditions historically have focused on federal law at the
expense of state law. This skewed focus toward federal law manifests itself in
several ways.
First, judges and lawyers are trained in federal law.181 Outside doctrinal
areas without federal analogues like contract law and tort law, law schools
given these pressures, 66% of the 1980 to 1991 federal amendments, and more than 25% of the 1993
federal amendments, were adopted by the states studied. Id. at 382.
176 Long, supra note 79, at 478, 505-06.
177 43 PA. CONS. STAT. § 955; 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-2(e) (2012).
178 City of Philadelphia v. Pa. Human Relations Comm’n, 300 A.2d 91, 101 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1973).
179 Goldfarb, supra note 81, at 90 (stating that, in civil rights law, “both federal and state law
play leading roles”).
180 Long, supra note 79, at 505-06.
181 Organizational sociology recognizes the normalizing force of common schooling. See
DiMaggio & Powell, supra note 146, at 152 (“Universities and professional training institutions are
important centers for the development of organizational norms among professional managers and
their staff . . . . Such mechanisms create a pool of almost interchangeable individuals who occupy
similar positions across a range of organizations and possess a similarity of orientation and
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typically require or emphasize federal law courses. Schools require federal
civil procedure and federal constitutional law, and offer courses in
employment discrimination, tax, evidence, administrative law, environmental
law, and many other areas focus on federal law.182 The multistate bar exam
requires knowledge of federal civil procedure, federal evidence, and federal
constitutional law,183 and more than a dozen states have adopted the Uniform
Bar Exam to reduce or even replace the need to test state-specific law.184
Federal judges hire students and recent graduates as interns and judicial
clerks. Once in practice, all but the most local practices have interactions with
federal law, and even attorneys focusing solely on state law continue to receive
federal-law schooling through continuing legal education courses and
interactions with federal practitioners and federal judges in their local bar
associations.185 In short, few members of the state bench and bar are not wellversed in the federal law analogues of state law.186
Second, lawyers often frame claims under federal law rather than state law
in order to take advantage of the national application of federal law. It is a

disposition that may override variations in tradition and control that might otherwise shape
organizational behavior.”). For an exploration of how this idea applies to state constitutional law,
with a discussion of the special role of political parties, see Gardner, supra note 118, at 59-60.
182 See, e.g., Arthur Earl Bonfield, State Law in the Teaching of Administrative Law: A Critical
Analysis of the Status Quo, 61 TEX. L. REV. 95, 99 (1982) (“[M]ost professors of administrative law study
only federal law, write only on federal law, and teach only federal law.”); Jennifer Friesen, Adventures in
Federalism: Some Observations on the Overlapping Spheres of State and Federal Constitutional Law, 3
WIDENER J. PUB. L. 25, 32 (1993) (criticizing law schools for the lack of state law education); Mazzone,
supra note 127, at 1063 (advocating for increased recognition of the important role of state courts in
advancing federal constitutional law); Williams, supra note 115, at 164 (“Very few courses on state
constitutional law are offered, and the basic federal constitutional law courses do not highlight state
constitutions.”). Bonfield blames this pedagogical focus on “a public fascination with the role of the
national government in public law,” a “prevalent but rarely expressed assumption that federal law is
inherently superior to state law in the administrative law area,” and law professors’ limited experiences
practicing state law. Bonfield, supra, at 98. But see Richard J. Pierce, Jr., How Much Should an
Administrative Law Course Accomplish?: A Response to Schotland’s Five Easy Pieces, 43 ADMIN. L. REV. 123,
124 (1991) (asserting that he “learned nothing” from studying state administrative decisionmaking that
is “generalizable” or that was “not available through study of federal agencies”). One notable exception
is criminal law, which has strong state-law representation in law schools.
183 See 2016 MBE Subject Matter Outline, MULTISTATE B. EXAMINATION, http://www.ncbex.org/
about-ncbe-exams/mbe/overview-of-the-mbe [http://perma.cc/LRE8-K6GL] (last visited Nov. 21, 2015).
184 See Uniform Bar Examination, NAT’L CONF. B. EXAMINERS, http://www.ncbex.org/exams/ube
[http://perma.cc/8SK8-P9V8] (last visited Nov. 21, 2015).
185 Main, supra note 20, at 374 (“Federal and state bar associations within a locality are—if not
the same attorneys—members of the same law firms, committees and organizations; they are
graduates of the same law schools; they attend the same continuing legal education classes; and they
navigate through the same social circles . . . . After all, federal and state judges were likely drawn
from the local bar and thus, may share those similarities of culture already discussed.”).
186 Possible exceptions include state prosecutors and criminal-defense attorneys, but they must
also contend with federal constitutional law. See U.S. CONST. amends. V-VIII (offering federal
constitutional rights to state criminal defendants).
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bigger, and potentially easier, win for a cause to succeed at the national level
in one fell swoop than to have to litigate state claims in all fifty states.187 For
example, disability-rights groups have focused on federal statutory law, to the
marginalization of state law.188 The result of this focus is that both state and
federal judges become more accustomed to construing controversial matters of
federal law than state law.189 Any state law issues that arise enter a conversation
so steeped in federal terms that lawyers and jurists tend to raise and address
those state issues in federal terms.190
Third, expansive doctrines of federal subject-matter jurisdiction give
federal judges ample, at times even primary, opportunity to interpret state
law from a federal-law focus. I have already discussed the efficiency and
cognitive-simplicity pressures on judges to decide analogous claims similarly.
Federal judges are particularly likely to approach analogous state claims with
federal law in mind, and the law gives them much opportunity to do so. The
Supreme Court’s Grable doctrine makes state claims with certain embedded
federal issues eligible for federal-question jurisdiction.191 Supplemental
jurisdiction gives federal courts subject-matter jurisdiction over any state
claim that is substantially related to a joined federal claim. 192 And if
plaintiffs do not file such mixed cases in federal court, defendants are likely
to remove them to federal court.193 Siphoning state claims away from state
courts has the additional effect of placing the primary burden of developing
precedent for those claims on federal courts, leaving state court precedent
underdeveloped and dependent upon federal court precedent.
187 See WILLIAMS, supra note 121, at 130-31 (describing the difficulty of applying state as
opposed to federal constitutional arguments).
188 See Michael E. Waterstone, Disability Constitutional Law, 63 EMORY L.J. 527, 529 (2014)
(“[T]oday the key tool for disability rights is litigation under federal statutes.”).
189 Causes tend to be advanced by repeat players, and that repetition might be a non-gravitational
factor. For example, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce is commonly known to be a repeat litigant in many
state and federal courts, and a repeat lobbyist before both state legislatures and Congress, and its
message is relatively consistent. No doubt the consistency of such repeat players’ efforts results in
pressure on lawmakers and courts to resolve issues in a similar way. Lawrence Hurley, Insight: Chamber of
Commerce Turns to Small Courts for Big Wins, REUTERS, (Sept. 23, 2013), http://reuters.com/article/
2013/09/23/us-usa-legal-chamber-insight-idUSBRE98M04P20130923 [http://perma.cc/9CJW-DJBB].
190 Cf. Robert F. Williams, In the Supreme Court’s Shadow: Legitimacy of State Rejection of Supreme
Court Reasoning and Result, 35 S.C. L. REV. 353, 403 (1984) (“[T]he dominance of the federal
constitutional law point of view, and more specifically, Supreme Court decisions, in present thought
about constitutional law. State constitutional law questions continue to be filtered almost exclusively
through the federal constitutional law perspective.”).
191 Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308 (2005).
192 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (2012).
193 See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Do Case Outcomes Really Reveal Anything About
the Legal System? Win Rates and Removal Jurisdiction, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 581, 581 (1998) (explaining that
one incentive for removal is that it defeats “plaintiffs’ forum advantage . . . [and] thereby shift[s] the biases,
inconveniences, court quality, and procedural law in [the defendants’] own favor”).
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Fourth, federal law gets attention because it is viewed as more prestigious.
News agencies cover federal law. Legal academics focus on federal law, to the
scholarly impoverishment of state law.194 State judges position themselves for
appointment to the federal bench. State legislators run for Congress. Governors
hope to be President. Practitioner prestige centers around big, interstate firms
with national practices. Law students prefer federal clerkships to state clerkships.
Today, in virtually every legal position, state-focused lawyers look to move up
to federal-focused positions. The U.S. Constitution has achieved almost religious
significance.195 And at the pinnacle of legal prestige is the U.S. Supreme Court,
which commands the utmost gravitas.196 Federal law is prestigious, pervasive,
and highly visible.197 It exhibits high expressive value.198 It is no wonder then
that state actors are drawn to it.
D. Political Cover
Compared to the justices on the Supreme Court, state judges are in a
precarious position. State court opinions can be overturned by the Supreme
Court, by federal law, or by state law. Most state constitutions are easier to
amend than the U.S. Constitution, and some are notoriously easier.199 These
situations present a substantial risk that a state judge’s decision will be
nullified or, worse, reversed as wrongly decided.200 Further, state court decisions
194 See Paul Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of Normative
Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063, 1105 n.228 (1981) (“[D]espite the increasing activism of
some courts, the state judiciary remains at the periphery of the scholars’ vision.”).
195 See Justin R. Long, Are State Constitutions Un-American? Book Review, Jeffrey M. Shaman, Equality
and Liberty in the Golden Age of State Constitutional Law (2009), 40 RUTGERS L.J. 793, 793 (2009) (“Our
secular scripture, the federal Constitution, retains a stranglehold on the constitutional imagination of the
bench, bar, academy, and public.”); id. at 802-03 (describing federal ratification of “a set of symbols and
ideas which, together, form a civic religion” of which the Constitution is the foremost relic).
196 See WILLIAMS, supra note 121, at 185 (asserting that the Supreme Court’s interpretations of
individual constitutional rights have an “overwhelming gravitational pull”); cf. Robert Nagel, The Role
of the Legislative and Executive Branches in Interpreting the Constitution, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 380, 382
(1988) (“[W]e are becoming accustomed to the idea that the direction, the emphasis, even the mood of
Supreme Court opinions is a kind of official orthodoxy binding on everyone else in the society.”).
197 See Goldfarb, supra note 81, at 92 (“[E]ven aside from supremacy, federal law has a degree
of visibility and persuasiveness that state law lacks.”); see also Susan Welch & Kay Thompson, The
Impact of Federal Incentives on State Policy Innovation, 24 AM. J. POL. SCI. 715, 718 (1980) (exploring
“pressures placed on states to conform to . . . national policy”).
198 See generally RICHARD H. MCADAMS, THE EXPRESSIVE POWERS OF LAW: THEORIES
AND LIMITS (2015).
199 Cf. Mazzone, supra note 127, at 1063 (observing that state constitutions are “more likely to
be amended in response to an adverse state court ruling”).
200 For example, in State v. Sarmiento, 397 So. 2d 643 (Fla. 1981), the Florida Supreme Court
interpreted the Florida Constitution more liberally than the U.S. Supreme Court had interpreted the
federal Fourth Amendment. Compare id., with United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971). Florida voters
amended the Florida Constitution to require state courts to follow the Supreme Court’s interpretation of
the federal Fourth Amendment (voters also amended the Florida Constitution to require state judges to
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on state-law matters tend to implicate state-law concerns that resonate with
state citizens and state officials. Even if not overturned, state court decisions
may face intense criticism from these constituencies.
Were state judges to hold life tenure like federal judges, they might not care
so tangibly about reactions to their decisions. But state judges do not have such
job security. Political and institutional conditions keep them close to state
politics.201 Most state judges are elected by state voters; others are term
appointed and reappointed by elected state officials.202 From a career standpoint,
state judges may care very deeply about how their decisions are perceived. State
judges have been voted off the bench because of the opinions they signed.203
Political and public backlash, then, is a real concern for many state judges.204
Following federal law and federal courts offers some cover against potential
backlash.205 Deciding an issue in tune with federal law allows state courts to
shift responsibility to federal law or the U.S. Supreme Court.206 State law decisions
that deviate from federal law are more likely to be overruled than those that
conform to federal law.207 Part of the reason may be the belief among state courts
that the Supreme Court’s decision on an important or policy-laden matter of
follow Supreme Court federal Eighth Amendment precedent). See Marks, supra note 122, at 703-04, 71112. California has experienced similar events. See Mazzone, supra note 127, at 1055.
201 See David E. Pozen, The Irony of Judicial Elections, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 265, 267-68 (2008).
202 Id.
203 See, e.g., Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and the Rule of Law,
62 U. CHI. L. REV. 689, 737 n.144 (1995) (documenting the 1986 defeat of Chief Justice Rose Bird
and two associate justices of the California Supreme Court in a retention election for setting aside
death penalties); A. G. Sulzberger, Ouster of Iowa Judges Sends Signal to Bench, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 3,
2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/04/us/politics/04judges.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/5QPAJWJK] (recounting the story of three Iowa justices voted off the bench in reaction to their decision
allowing same-sex marriage).
204 See Mazzone, supra note 127, at 1051-53. It can be difficult to predict when voter or political
backlash against judicial opinions might occur. See SHAMAN, supra note 123, at 252 (noting the
absence of voter backlash to state constitutional interpretations expanding abortion and same-sex
rights in some states). All the more reason for the risk-adverse state judge to seek political cover
whenever possible.
205 See Wayne A. Logan, A House Divided: When State and Lower Federal Courts Disagree on
Federal Constitutional Rights, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 235, 247 (2014) (“Adopting a right-restrictive
position might also be seen [by state judges] as the ‘safest’ position . . . .”); Mazzone, supra note 127,
at 1053-54.
206 If state courts decide an issue without making clear that the opinion is based on state law,
the Supreme Court will have appellate jurisdiction to review it as if the opinion were based on
federal law. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041 (1983) (“[W]hen the adequacy and independence
of any possible state law ground is not clear from the face of the opinion, we will accept as the most
reasonable explanation that the state court decided the case the way it did because it believed that
federal law required it to do so.”). State courts thus must walk a fine line between blame shifting
and opening themselves up to the threat of Supreme Court reversal. However, the Supreme Court’s
limited docket makes reversal highly unlikely, and, even if reversal occurs, the state court still escapes
blame for the substantive result.
207 See Williams, supra note 190, at 357.
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federal law can reflect public sentiment in a way that gives state courts
confronted with a similar issue comfort that their analogous resolution of state
law will be politically safe. This explanation is especially powerful if the
national sentiments reflected in the Supreme Court’s opinion are mirrored in
the particular state in which the state court sits.
Another part of the reason may be the political cost of rejecting the
Supreme Court’s view. In other words, even when the Supreme Court does
not reflect public opinion—or at least the public opinion of a particular state
court’s state—the Supreme Court commands a level of gravitas that seems to
generate an expectation of following absent compelling reasons for deviation.
If a dropped rock falls to the ground, one needs no explanation, but if it defies
gravity, one wonders what the hell is going on. Similarly, it is far easier for a
state judge to tell voters that her opinion follows the reasoning of the Supreme
Court than to try to explain why she diverged.208
These explanations seem to fit particularly well in certain matters of
constitutional and statutory law. Recall the story of gay rights and Bowers v.
Hardwick told in Part I.209 Following Bowers—a rights-restrictive decision
holding a state statute criminalizing consensual, private, adult sodomy valid
under the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution210—many state courts
interpreted their state constitutions accordingly.211 Indeed, despite its
nonpreemptive and narrow holding,212 Bowers was a major factor in the
stagnation of gay rights over the next ten years.213 In 1996, Congress passed,
and President Bill Clinton signed, the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA),
which defined marriage for purposes of federal law as between one man and
one woman and allowed states to refuse to recognize same-sex marriages
validated elsewhere.214 Immediately following the federal government’s lead,

208 This idea is roughly analogous to the theory in organizational sociology that isomorphism
generates legitimacy for and enhances the reputation of the copier. See, e.g., DiMaggio & Powell, supra
note 146, at 151-52 (theorizing that organizational isomorphism is a cheap way to gain legitimacy); Mark
C. Suchman, Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional Approaches, 20 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 571,
593-94 (1995) (arguing that imitation failures can decrease organizational legitimacy). For foundational
work on organizational legitimacy, see generally TALCOTT PARSONS, STRUCTURE AND PROCESS IN
MODERN SOCIETIES (1960); MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY (Guenther Roth & Claus
Wittich eds., Ephraim Fischoff et al. trans., 1978).
209 See supra subsection I.B.2.
210 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
211 For my earlier discussion of Bowers, see supra text accompanying notes 130–40.
212 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190 (noting that the case does not require a judgment about whether a
state court may invalidate similar laws on state law grounds).
213 See, e.g., Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068, 1076 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (“After Hardwick
it cannot logically be asserted that discrimination against homosexuals is constitutionally infirm.”).
214 Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7
(1996)), invalidated in part by United States v. Windsor, 113 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
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most states enacted mini-DOMAs restricting marriage under state law to
opposite-sex couples.215
States that diverged by expanding gay rights under state law tended to be
quickly reined in,216 and, until very recently, significant popular backlash,
both generalized and targeted, to state advances of gay rights was a real
threat.217 For example, in a widely reported retention election, three justices
of the Iowa Supreme Court were voted down for retention primarily on the
basis of an opinion they joined that required Iowa to recognize same-sex
marriage. This was the first time an Iowa Supreme Court justice had ever
been rejected for retention.218
It was not until the Supreme Court decided United States v. Windsor,219
holding the federal Defense of Marriage Act unconstitutional under the Fifth
Amendment, that states felt protected enough to begin advancing gay-marriage
equality with vigor.220 Windsor, of course, was purely an interpretation of
federal law and went out of its way to note the federalism underpinnings that
give states different prerogatives on defining marriage.221 Yet even when not
controlling, Supreme Court decisions offer states political cover. The Supreme
Court of New Mexico, for example, relied on Windsor (and Romer, Lawrence,
and Loving222) in construing its own state constitution to guarantee marriage

215 See Same-Sex Marriage Laws, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (June 26, 2015), http://www.
ncsl.org/research/human-services/same-sex-marriage-laws.aspx [http://perma.cc/BP97-NS3Q] (noting
that before October 6, 2014, thirty-one states had statutory or constitutional provisions that defined
marriage as between a man and a woman).
216 See, e.g., Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 68 (Haw. 1993) (holding restrictions on gay marriage
presumptively unconstitutional under the Hawaii constitution), superseded by HAW. CONST. art. I, § 23
(abrogated 2015). Exceptions include Goodridge v. Massachusetts Department of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d
941 (Mass. 2003), and Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999), which are decisions from liberal states
whose polls showed meaningful support for gay marriage. See Carlos A. Ball, The Backlash Thesis and
Same-Sex Marriage: Learning from Brown v. Board of Education and Its Aftermath, 14 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS. J. 1493, 1501, 1529 (2006) (explaining that support for same-sex marriage in Massachusetts
and Vermont was greater than in the rest of the country). But even Massachusetts felt political backlash.
See id. at 1500-01 (describing the response of social conservatives in the federal government and the
Massachusetts state government as “immediate and forceful”). The Massachusetts court in Goodridge,
perhaps anticipating that backlash, relied heavily on whatever support it could find from the Supreme
Court in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), and Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), even though
those decisions did not, on their face, speak to state-law recognition of gay marriage. Goodridge, 798
N.E.2d at 948, 953, 958-59, 961-62.
217 See Ball, supra note 216, at 1500-05, 1511-16, 1523; Franklin, supra note 140, at 844-45. For a
seminal study of backlash, see MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE
SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY (2004).
218 Sulzberger, supra note 203.
219 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
220 See Same-Sex Marriage Laws, supra note 215.
221 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2691-92, 2696.
222 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
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equality.223 Those Supreme Court cases did not demand the result the state
court reached—indeed, they expressly disavowed any implications for it—but,
as high-profile Supreme Court decisions, they no doubt gave the state court
more security in reaching it.
The same scenario plays out in matters of statutory law that focus on
sensitive policy issues. As one commentator has argued,
Simply stated, a state judge, despite having the inherent authority to
construe a state statute in a manner inconsistent with federal law, may
hesitate to announce to the world that a majority of the country’s
highest court got the issue wrong, either because the judge wants to
avoid charges of judicial activism or out of respect for the reputation
of the Supreme Court.224
Procedure cases offer a counterpoint. Much of procedure is apolitical.225
Procedural choices often escape the attention of the lay public—and often of
legislators. Rulemakers have, at least until very recently, been insulated from
the kind of politics that dominate legislation.226 States were procedural leaders
for centuries before the adoption of the 1938 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
so political cover is not a strong impetus for state following of federal
procedure.227 Of course, where federal procedure takes a decidedly
provocative turn, such as through the revolutionary changes of 1938 or the
widely maligned Twombly and Iqbal decisions, acceptance of those federal
changes can offer political cover for states that follow them.228 Political cover
may thus offer some explanatory value for the following of replica states or
those that have adopted Twombly and Iqbal.
In the run-of-the-mill procedure choices, however, there is far less
political effect. Federal procedural law has no preemptive effect, and the
Supreme Court cannot reverse a state court on an issue of state procedural

223
224
225

See Griego v. Oliver, 316 P.3d 865, 870-72, 883-86 (N.M. 2013).
Long, supra note 79, at 479.
I mean this relatively. Politics can influence procedure but usually less frequently and less
strongly than substantive law.
226 See Richard Marcus, Procedural Polarization in America? (“One activity that might escape
[political polarization] is the process of making procedure rules. In the U.S. federal courts, that
process has been somewhat insulated from political pressures, and that insulation has largely been
respected in recent decades.”), in 18 ZZPINT: ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR ZIVILPROZESS INTERNATIONAL:
JAHRBUCH DES INTERNATIONALEN ZIVILPROZESSRECHTS 303, 303 (2013).
227 See id. at 304 (explaining that until the adoption of the federal rules Congress directed
those courts to follow the procedure used by the states in which they sat).
228 This may help explain Oakley and Coon’s findings that replica states tend to be less populous,
while the most divergent states tend to be larger and more populous. See Oakley & Coon, supra note
16, at 1426. Legislators of big states, because of geographic dispersion and voter dilution, are less
accountable to any particular faction and thus have greater political freedom to diverge.

744

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 164: 703

law.229 Procedural choices do not often generate front-page news.230 I thus
infer only weak explanatory power of political cover for the gravitational pull
of federal procedure on states.
E. Force of Habit
A final explanation for state following is behavioral path dependence.231
In essence, following becomes a habit; following for a while makes following
easier and more acceptable.
The history of state following is long. It is no surprise that state law, courts,
and practice have always looked roughly the same (certainly compared to other
countries). The common-law tradition in particular, in which states have been
steeped for centuries, looks to build by horizontal following.232 The famous 1928
“proximate cause” opinion Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad,233 for example, has
been followed by nearly every state.234 In procedural circles, the New York Field
Code, adopted in 1848, quickly became the model for most states.235
The late 1930s marked a new era of following: vertical following. For the
first time, federal courts had an independent, comprehensive, and uniform
procedure. Federal statutory law exploded.236 And the Supreme Court mounted
a robust campaign of expanding federal regulatory power and federal constitutional
rights, shutting out and constraining the states. On all fronts, federal law was
flexing its muscles. These historical efforts shifted the balance of power and
preeminence to the federal government and, particularly, to the Supreme
Court. Federal law became the new leader.237

229 See Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 722 (1988) (“Since the procedural rules of its
courts are surely matters on which a State is competent to legislate, it follows that a State may apply
its own procedural rules to actions litigated in its courts.”).
230 See Marcus, supra note 226, at 303.
231 For a sample of studies of behavioral path dependence in organizational sociology, see
generally DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE (1990); Jörg Sydow & Jochen Koch, Organizational Path Dependence: Opening the
Black Box, 34 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 689 (2009).
232 Williams, supra note 115, at 152.
233 162 N.E. 99, 99 (N.Y. 1928).
234 See W. Jonathan Cardi, The Hidden Legacy of Palsgraf: Modern Duty Law in Microcosm, 91
B.U. L. REV. 1873, 1890 (2011).
235 Subrin, supra note 12, at 939.
236 See 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 42-44 (1991).
237 That is not to say that federal law always leads. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 651-52 (1961)
(incorporating the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary remedy against the states based in part on a
recognition that the California Supreme Court had adopted the exclusionary rule and deemed it to have
been highly successful); see also Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 313-17 (2002) (surveying states to
determine when a right has been deemed so “fundamental” as to be protected under the federal Due
Process Clause); Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 370 (1989) (surveying states to determine when a
punishment is so “cruel and unusual” as to be prohibited by the Eighth Amendment).
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As part of this shift, the states found themselves with very little room to
diverge from the advancement of federal substantive law. Under the Supremacy
Clause, the Court’s aggressive expansion of federal law and federal rights was
binding on the states, such that the states had little more to do other than to
rotely follow the Supreme Court.238 This era inculcated a culture of following
that led to the atrophy of the motivation of states to use state law independently.239
In the 1970s, the Burger Court began scaling back federal power and
progressives like William Brennan turned to the states to urge independent
enforcement of rights.240 Yet after more than thirty years, the states were not
used to developing state law independently.241 As a result, “[t]he degree to
which state courts have answered the call to action remains debatable” and
seems, even today, to be characterized by default state following with pockets
of exceptions.242
The force of habit may help explain why some states blindly followed the
procedural decisions of Twombly and Iqbal. After 1938, when federal procedure
came to the fore, state rulemakers followed the Federal Rules, and state courts
followed the Supreme Court’s Conley decision for decades.243 The Supreme
Court’s shifts in Twombly and Iqbal were just new bends in a long-traveled
road. Old habits can be hard to break.
Yet there is some evidence that those habits are cracking in certain places.
Some state courts have resisted Twombly and Iqbal.244 State rulemakers are less
and less likely to adopt federal rule amendments.245 States break more readily
from constitutional decisions of the Supreme Court. It is unclear whether the
gravitational pull of federal law is weakening or the willingness of states to
resist is strengthening. For whatever reason, another watershed moment
looms on the horizon: an opportunity to consider more fully the implications
of state following, with the potential for meaningful implementation. It is to
that question I now turn.

238 See Mazzone, supra note 127, at 1061 (“[A] legacy of historical trends . . . . has turned state
judges into expert and busy administrators of the Federal Constitution.”).
239 See Brennan, supra note 115, at 495 (“I suppose it was only natural that when during the
1960s our rights and liberties were in the process of becoming increasingly federalized, state courts
saw no reason to consider what protections, if any, were secured by state constitutions.”). See generally
Howard, supra note 119 (providing an overview of state activity on a number of rights).
240 See, e.g., William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of State
Constitutions as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 535, 548 (1986). A good summary
of this history is provided in Blocher, supra note 119, at 335-37.
241 See generally Howard, supra note 119.
242 Blocher, supra note 119, at 338.
243 See supra subsection I.A.2.a.
244 See supra note 56.
245 See, e.g., Oakley, supra note 19, at 355.
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III. NORMATIVE CONCERNS
This Part sketches some normative downsides of federal law’s gravitational
force, including its effects on interstate variation and fidelity to state law,
sovereign reputation, and cyclical entrenchment. I do not mean to say that
these downsides will or should always carry the day. Rather, I only identify
them as necessary considerations in any normative debate about the gravitational
force of federal law.
A. Interstate Variation and Fidelity to State Law
Whatever the virtues of vertical uniformity, they come at the expense of the
countervailing virtues of variation, a system benefit.246 States are, in Brandeis’s
words, laboratories of experimentation,247 allowing a small part of the nation to
experiment—risking potential failure for the accumulation of knowledge and
the possible rewards of success—without damaging the whole. Unsure whether
heightened pleading imposes too high of a hurdle for certain plaintiffs? A state
can test it first. Think that society will be improved with greater abortion rights
than federal law currently mandates? A state can try it out. Believe in expanded
rights for disabled workers? A state can offer them. For those who find
heterogeneity stimulating and beautiful, variation is its own reward. For those
convinced by the virtues of homogeneity, allowing temporary, controlled, and
collaborative variation may help achieve uniformity in a better form.248
Acceding to federal law’s gravitational pull gives up on these system
benefits. Federal law is nationally uniform. If each state pursues intrastate
uniformity by following federal law, then state law will mimic federal law in
all states, stagnating experimentation and evolution at both the intra- and
interstate levels.
Variation also enhances fidelity to state law, akin to what Richard Fallon
calls “legal legitimacy.”249 Because individual states are unrepresentative of
246 See DAVID L. SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE 75-106 (1995) (arguing that some
state autonomy in policymaking results in economic, political, and social benefits); Vicki C. Jackson,
Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz and Principle?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2180, 2213-15
(1998) (describing the benefits of federalism as identified in scholarly literature on constitutional
federalism and new jurisprudence).
247 See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“[A]
single courageous State may . . . serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments
without risk to the rest of the country.”).
248 See Koppel, supra note 8, at 1176 (“I propose that state judicial systems continue to develop
their independent rulemaking capabilities, but not by competing with each other. Rather than competing
as laboratories, I propose that states cooperate as laboratories through a mechanism of controlled
experimentation designed to inform a collaborative rulemaking process leading to a model code of
state civil procedure.”).
249 Fallon, supra note 158, at 1794-96.
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the nation as a whole, state following of federal law may lead to disconnects
between state policies, state law, and state judicial interpretation.
In substantive areas, the lawmaking stage is meant to create state laws that
reflect the peculiar policies and preferences of the state electorate. Blind state
following may cause state law to map poorly onto those policies and preferences,
to the ultimate detriment of that segment of the nation. This is particularly
true for constitutional law, which embodies the most important and fundamental
values of a polity. At the interpretative stage, state courts eager to track
nonpreemptive federal law may misinterpret state law, resulting in further
distance between the preferences of state citizens and the laws that govern
them. The California courts’ difficulty resisting the impulse to treat state
disability law differently from federal disability law is just one example.250 The
drift of state law away from its popular or legislative moorings erodes the legal
legitimacy of the state law-speaking institutions.
Procedural law is no different. State dockets differ from federal dockets in
both the number and the type of cases.251 State courts often have fewer resources
in terms of technology, judicial clerks, magistrate judges, or other support
personnel. Differences in structures, resources, and policy goals may demand
different procedures.252 Inattention to these differences can lead to state procedural
rules that are inapt or costly for the local bench and bar. The gravitational
force of federal law risks pulling state law in directions it ought not go.
It may well be that vertical uniformity is, on balance, worth pursuing for
certain states in certain areas of the law. Vertical uniformity may be especially
warranted when social mores within a particular state reflect with specificity
the social mores of the nation, and when the state legislature, in responding to
the state citizenry’s preferences, enacts laws that mimic federal laws. It may
even be warranted as an independent interpretive tool when its values are
overwhelmingly beneficial. But states ought not overpraise it uncritically or
demand rote adherence to it. Instead, when a state considers whether to follow

250
251

See supra text accompanying notes 101–05.
See, e.g., Roger Michalski & Abby K. Wood, Twombly and Iqbal at the State Level 4 (USC Law
Legal Studies, Working Paper No. 14-30, 2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2468864
[http://perma.cc/4QZ8-7V88] (“Litigants in state courts tend to litigate smaller claims, have fewer
litigation and pre-suit investigative resources available to them, and conclude cases more quickly
than litigants in federal courts. State judges, similarly, typically face higher caseloads than their
federal counterparts and frequently are democratically accountable.”).
252 See, e.g., Koppel, supra note 8, at 1187-88 (describing arguments against using federal
procedures in state courts); Stephen N. Subrin, Uniformity in Procedural Rules and the Attributes of a
Sound Procedural System: The Case for Presumptive Limits, 49 ALA. L. REV. 79, 83 (1997) (noting that
uniformity “may not make sense” on account of the federal courts’ caseload and access to resources);
see also Subrin, supra note 16, at 1650 (discussing the motivations behind the evolution of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure).
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federal law, the justifications for uniformity should be judged on a case-by-case
basis and contrasted with the competing benefits of variation.
B. Sovereign Reputation
The Supreme Court has insisted that states exist in the federalist system
as quasi-independent sovereigns, not as mere dependencies or appendages of
the federal government.253 But the Court’s own gravitational force undermines
this view. When states follow federal law without independent consideration
of state structures and values, they risk appearing to be secondary afterthoughts
of the federal government rather than intellectual equals.254 The parity debate
that Burt Neuborne began decades ago persists,255 and, though that debate’s
focus on state competence to enforce controlling federal law is orthogonal to
my thesis, uncritical state following of noncontrolling federal law lends credence
to the position that states are just not as good at being sovereign as the federal
government is.256 States risk being seen as simple-minded dependents of their
smarter older sibling.257
Such a reputational hit would implicate a number of federalism doctrines
that depend upon the assumption that states are equally competent to create
and interpret their law independently and competently. For example, in the
abstention case of Railroad Commission v. Pullman Co.,258 the Court adopted a
policy of avoiding federal constitutional questions when a state might resolve a

253 See Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 751 (2002) (“States, upon
ratification of the Constitution, did not consent to become mere appendages of the Federal
Government. Rather, they entered the Union with their sovereignty intact.”).
254 See Dodson, supra note 10, at 17.
255 See Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1977) (arguing that the
assumption of parity between state and federal courts is false). See generally MICHAEL E. SOLIMINE &
JAMES L. WALKER, RESPECTING STATE COURTS: THE INEVITABILITY OF JUDICIAL FEDERALISM
(1999); Paul M. Bator, The State Courts and Federal Constitutional Litigation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV.
605 (1981); Burt Neuborne, Toward Procedural Parity in Constitutional Litigation, 22 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 725 (1981); Michael E. Solimine & James L. Walker, Constitutional Litigation in Federal and State
Courts: An Empirical Analysis of Judicial Parity, 10 HAST. CONST. L.Q. 213 (1983). Of course, rote state
following of controlling federal law could be seen as consistent with the core parity argument that states
are faithful appliers and enforcers of federal law.
256 This concern is related to, though not identical to, Richard Fallon’s idea of “sociological legitimacy,”
or public acceptance of a law pronouncement. Fallon, supra note 158, at 1794-96. For attempts to quantify the
legitimacy of the Supreme Court and its opinions, see generally Dion Farganis, Do Reasons Matter? The Impact
of Opinion Content on Supreme Court Legitimacy, 65 POL. RES. Q. 206 (2012), and James L. Gibson et al.,
Measuring Attitudes Toward the United States Supreme Court, 47 AM. J. POL. SCI. 354 (2003).
257 Cf. Sanford Levinson, On Positivism and Potted Plants: “Inferior” Judges and the Task of
Constitutional Interpretation, 25 CONN. L. REV. 843, 845 (1993) (making an analogous point regarding
lower federal courts in relation to the Supreme Court).
258 312 U.S. 496 (1941).

2016]

The Gravitational Force of Federal Law

749

dispute on state-law grounds, in part because of “scrupulous regard for the
rightful independence of the state governments.”259 The Court explained:
The law of Texas appears to furnish easy and ample means for
determining the Commission’s authority . . . . In the absence of any
showing that these obvious methods for securing a definitive ruling in
the state courts cannot be pursued with full protection of the
constitutional claim, the district court should exercise its wise discretion
by staying its hands.260
Similarly, in Burford v. Sun Oil Co.,261 the Supreme Court resisted intruding
on intricate matters of state law because the state of Texas had established a
comprehensive and effective regulatory regime.262 The Court stated:
The State provides a unified method for the formation of policy and
determination of cases by the Commission and by the state courts.
The judicial review of the Commission’s decisions in the state courts
is expeditious and adequate. Conflicts in the interpretation of state
law, dangerous to the success of state policies, are almost certain to
result from the intervention of the lower federal courts . . . . Under
such circumstances, a sound respect for the independence of state
action requires the federal equity court to stay its hand.263
And in Ankenbrandt v. Richards,264 the Court interpreted the federal
diversity-jurisdiction statute to exempt certain domestic-relations issues from
federal jurisdiction, in part because “state courts are more eminently suited
to work of this type than are federal courts” and “because of the special
proficiency developed by state tribunals over the past century and a half in
handling [those] issues.” 265 In other cases declining federal jurisdiction,
the Court relies on the same assumption.266

259
260
261
262
263

Id. at 501.
Id.
319 U.S. 315 (1943).
Id. at 320-32.
Id. at 333-34; see also id. at 332 (“These questions of regulation of the industry by the State
administrative agency . . . so clearly involve[] basic problems of Texas policy that equitable discretion
should be exercised to give the Texas courts the first opportunity to consider them.”).
264 504 U.S. 689 (1992).
265 Id. at 704.
266 See, e.g., Ill. Commerce Comm’n v. Thomson, 318 U.S. 675 (1943) (declining equity
jurisdiction to aid a railroad that has an adequate state remedy); Beal v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Corp., 312
U.S. 45 (1941) (refusing to grant a federal injunction of a state criminal statute in the absence of
irreparable injury to the plaintiff); Atlas Life Ins. Co. v. W.I. S., Inc., 306 U.S. 563, 573 (1939) (“The
guiding principle is that the federal court should proceed . . . without needlessly interfering with
the determination of the plaintiff ’s rights in the state court.”).
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Relatedly, the doctrine of supplemental jurisdiction generally allows, for
practical and efficiency reasons, a federal court hearing one claim over which it
has original jurisdiction to hear related nondiverse state claims that otherwise
would be relegated to state court.267 Underscoring the assumption that state
courts are more competent to adjudicate matters of state law, however, the
supplemental-jurisdiction statute gives federal courts the discretion to decline to
hear supplemental state claims.268 In practice, federal courts routinely decline
to hear supplemental state claims when no original-jurisdiction claims remain
on the ground that state courts are equally competent as—if not more
competent than—federal courts at resolving issues of state law.269
Another effect implicates the Court’s longstanding refusal to accept issues of
state law on appeal from state courts. In Murdock v. Memphis, the Court wrote:
The State courts are the appropriate tribunals, as this court has repeatedly
held, for the decision of questions arising under their local law, whether
statutory or otherwise. And it is not lightly to be presumed that Congress
acted upon a principle which implies a distrust of their integrity or of their
ability to construe those laws correctly.270

On a larger scale, state sovereign competence underlies the very idea of a
limited national government that leaves most regulation to state governments.271
It is in large part because the states are deemed to be capable of “perform[ing]
many of the vital functions of modern government”272 that even within areas
of concurrent federal and state power, the assumption has always been that
locally accountable state governments should create and administer the laws—
i.e., state law—that most concern the lives and liberties of their citizens.273 Faith

267
268
269

See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (2012).
See id. § 1367(c).
See, e.g., Horne v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 969 F. Supp. 2d 1203, 1210 (C.D. Cal. 2013)
(declining jurisdiction over state law claims when state courts are “equally competent and more
familiar with the governing law”). As the seminal case on then-called “pendent” jurisdiction
reasoned, “[n]eedless decisions of state law should be avoided both as a matter of comity and to
promote justice between the parties, by procuring for them a surer-footed reading of applicable law.”
United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966).
270 Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590, 626 (1874).
271 See generally United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (limiting the reach of federal
authority under the Commerce Clause for activity deemed a classic use of a state’s police power);
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (limiting the reach of federal authority under the
Commerce Clause in a case involving general police powers normally retained by the states).
272 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2578 (2012).
273 Cf. THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at 289 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (noting
that the powers delegated to the federal government will be exercised primarily on external objects,
while those delegated to the states will extend to the objects concerning the lives, liberties, and
property of the people of the state).
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in state governance has justified the presumption against federal preemption,
leaving space for states to regulate effectively.274
Each of these examples depends upon state competence to create, interpret,
and adjudicate state law faithfully and autonomously as an independent sovereign.
Our dual federalism depends upon some level of sovereign parity; without it, the
nation is susceptible to deficiency and imbalance.275 The gravitational force of
federal law threatens that parity by undermining state sovereign reputation.
To be clear, some state parallelism preserves sovereign reputation. If a state
court interpreting state law follows federal law or federal reasoning because
it is consistent with state-codified law and policy, then the state court fulfills the
sovereign judicial function of using independent judgment to reach a conclusion
that just happened to mirror a different court’s.276 But slavishly following
nonpreemptive federal law without considering state variables degrades both state
law and state courts.
Of course, a divergent interpretation could undermine sovereign reputation
if seemingly inconsistent interpretations lead the public to conclude that one
(or each) sovereign is unprincipled or incompetent, or that the law is unjustly
indeterminate.277 I recognize this issue, but in a dual-sovereign system in
which sovereigns are fully permitted to adopt inconsistent legal paradigms,278
the conclusion that state divergence from federal law must be the product of
incompetency or illegitimacy can only be premised on the very gravitational
pull identified in Part I.
C. Cyclical Entrenchment
Following breeds following beyond mere habit. Just as a black hole attracts
more mass, making its gravitational pull ever stronger, following’s effects
inculcate institutional norms that then compound the lure of following.
274 See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (“[B]ecause the States are independent
sovereigns in our federal system, we have long presumed that Congress does not cavalierly pre-empt
state-law causes of action.”).
275 Cf. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458-59 (1991) (explaining that the Framers
contemplated “a healthy balance of power between the States and the Federal Government”).
276 See Dodson, supra note 10.
277 Cf. Evan H. Caminker, Precedent and Prediction: The Forward-Looking Aspects of Inferior Court
Decisionmaking, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1, 39-40 (1994) (stating in the context of intra-federal inconsistencies
that “divergent judicial interpretations seem both irrational and unfair”). For a possible example, see
Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 2(a)(4), 119 Stat. 5 (2005) (justifying expanded
federal jurisdiction over class actions on the ground that state courts hearing class actions are
“sometimes acting in ways that demonstrate bias against out-of-State defendants”).
278 See Ely, supra note 167, at 710 (arguing that “forum shopping is not an evil per se”); Lawrence
Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212,
1249-51 (1978) (describing examples of inconsistent legal paradigms between state and federal
governments and highlighting how such diversity is “often consider[ed] . . . a virtue”).
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If states routinely mimic federal law rather than innovate, then all eyes
will train on the federal leader. Lawyers and judges will focus on and familiarize
themselves with federal law. Law schools will teach, and bar exams will test,
federal law at the expense of state law. Federal actors will command more
prestige. Federal-law arguments will dominate state-law development. These
effects—the very explanatory vectors discussed above—create a feedback loop
in which the results of state following cycle back to strengthen federal law’s
gravitational effect.
The cycle is not unbreakable, and there may be enough inherent faith in
states that the cycle merely perpetuates an imbalanced equilibrium rather
than spiraling uncontrollably. But appreciating the feedback effect helps
explain both the present state of the primacy of federal law and the difficulty
of freeing state autonomy from its clutches.
CONCLUSION
This Article tells a story of federal law’s gravitational force on the states.
I make the case that a gravitational force operates across the law, including
procedural law, statutory law, constitutional law, and interpretations of each.
State actors of all stripes—from rulemakers to legislators to judges—feel the
gravitational pull. I offer some theoretical explanations for why states might
follow federal leads, including practical and political reasons. And I offer
some normative commentary on the effects of federal law’s gravitational force
on state sovereign reputation and efficacy.
My aim is primarily to urge greater introspection and transparency. I mean
to empower, not disparage. State legislators and judges can be strong leaders in
matters of analogous state and federal law. They should do more to assert and
demonstrate that leadership. Exercising independence and leadership does not
mean always diverging. Perhaps independent and sound judgment will dictate
state results that mirror federal results, and, even if not, perhaps the cost savings
of state mimicry more than offset the costs of infidelity to state law. Here,
reasoning matters more than results. And when states feel compelled to mimic,
they should not forget their long tradition of horizontal borrowing; sister-state
law may have just as much to say as federal law.
To federal lawmakers and judges, I urge sensitivity to their own gravitational
power. Congress, in the first instance, should respect both the primacy of the
states and the ways in which even nonpreemptive federal statutes inhibit state
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innovation.279 The Court, for its part, can send signals in many ways,280 and
one way is by expressly reminding states of their independence in nonpreemptive
matters.281 Another way is by undercutting the hegemony of federal leadership.
The modern Court has, in rare instances, taken cues from state developments,
and it has sporadically looked to foreign precedents and norms. A culture of
leadership breeds followers; alloying that leadership with instances of following
may spawn a more inclusive and instructive conversation.
This methodological approach of the descriptive portion of this Article
has been primarily anecdotal, and no doubt others will point to counterexamples
illustrating state independence and resistance. To reiterate, my claim is that
a gravitational force exists, not that it is inexorable. Nor do I claim that the
gravitational force is uniform for all states, over time, among various actors,
or across subject-matter areas. To the contrary, it seems highly likely that a
complicated set of conditions informs the strength of the gravitational force.
That does not undermine my thesis, but it does mean that much more work
needs to be done. My hope is that this Article provokes commentators to
excavate other examples of state following or state resistance. Only with a
more detailed record of when states follow and when they diverge can we
better appreciate and understand the full scope and effect of the gravitational
force of federal law.

279 Cf. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 577-78 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (reminding
Congress of its “grave constitutional obligation” to maintain the balance between federal and state power).
280 See Richard M. Re, Supreme Court Signals, RE’S JUDICATA (Nov. 11, 2014, 8:28 AM)
https://richardresjudicata.wordpress.com/2014/11/11/supreme-court-signals [http://perma.cc/N6K58F86] (discussing the “Supreme Court’s ability to send non-precedential signals to lower courts”).
281 The spectre of preemption can undermine even such express reminders. See Franklin, supra
note 140, at 871-72 & 871 n.248 (arguing that Windsor, despite emphasizing the states’ presumed
authority in matters of marriage, could be read to compel marriage equality for the states).

